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Presidents Reagan and Clinton laid the foundation for strong presidential con-
trol over the administrative state, institutionalizing White House review of
agency regulations. Presidential control, however, did not stop there. To the
contrary, it has evolved and deepened during the presidencies of George W.
Bush and Barack Obama. Indeed, President Obama’s efforts to control agency
action have dominated the headlines in recent months, touching on everything
from immigration to drones to net neutrality.
Despite the entrenchment of presidential control over the modern regulatory
state, administrative law has yet to adapt. To date, the most pervasive re-
sponse both inside and outside the courts has been a reflexive form of “exper-
tise forcing,” which simplistically views presidential influence as “bad” and
technocratic decisionmaking as “good.” In narrowly focusing on the negative
aspects of presidential control, expertise forcing overlooks key benefits that flow
from presidential control—namely, political accountability and regulatory co-
herence. It also ignores the fact that presidential control is here to stay. A more
realistic and nuanced response to presidential control is needed. After examin-
ing three different case studies and discussing the inadequacies of expertise
forcing, this Article provides a roadmap for how a wide range of nonconstitu-
tional administrative law doctrines could be coordinated to enhance the posi-
tive attributes and restrain the negative attributes of presidential control. The
Article gives attention to doctrinal tools, such as judicial review doctrines and
notice-and-comment procedures, falling into three general categories: statuto-
rily facing rules; transparency-enhancing mechanisms; and process-forcing
rules. If used in a coordinated fashion, doctrinal tools falling into each of these
three categories provide a powerful and much-needed framework for respond-
ing to the new realities of presidential control and ultimately controlling—
without unnecessarily constraining—presidential control.
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Introduction
In 2001, then-Professor and now Supreme Court Justice Elena Kagan
published a foundational article that documented a dramatic rise in presi-
dential control over the regulatory state.1 Kagan argued that a “distinctive
form of administration and administrative control,” which she called “presi-
dential administration,” emerged under Ronald Reagan and surged during
Bill Clinton’s presidency.2 Kagan saw the emergence of this strong form of
presidential administration as a positive development because, by her ac-
count, presidential control promotes political accountability and trans-
parency,3 and it furthers effective and coherent regulatory policy.4 Yet, when
1. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245 (2001).
2. Id. at 2250.
3. Id. at 2331–39.
4. Id. at 2339–46.
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she published her article in 2001,5 Kagan noted that it was unclear whether
future developments might raise new problems and challenge old assump-
tions about presidential administration.6
This Article picks up where Kagan left off nearly fifteen years ago, dem-
onstrating that presidential control has deepened during the most recent
two presidencies and confirming Kagan’s intuition that a reassessment of
presidential control would be necessary. As this Article shows, both Republi-
can President George W. Bush and Democratic President Barack Obama
have exerted significant control over the regulatory state. Bush often did so
by relying on various forms of covert command. The Bush administration,
for example, demonstrated a behind-the-scenes willingness to influence
agencies’ scientific findings.7 In addition, Bush relied heavily on the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB), which reviews executive agencies’ pro-
posed and final regulations as well as their regulatory plans, to exert aggres-
sive and often-veiled White House control over agency rules.8 Obama
likewise has relied on the somewhat secretive OMB review process.9 Obama,
however—taking a cue from Clinton—has also relied heavily on overt com-
mand, trying to turn the regulatory state into an extension of his own politi-
cal agenda by frequently issuing written directives and publicly claiming
ownership of regulatory policy.10 Indeed, many of Obama’s very public ef-
forts to direct the regulatory state have been splashed across the headlines in
recent months.11 From net neutrality12 to drones13 to immigration,14 Obama
5. Kagan’s article was published in June 2001, just six months into George W. Bush’s
presidency. As a result, Kagan was able to draw on only a few preliminary examples from the
Bush administration. Id. at 2315, 2318–19.
6. Id. at 2385 (“[T]he practice of presidential control over administration likely will
continue to evolve in ways that raise new issues and cast doubt on old conclusions.”).
7. See infra Section I.B.1.b (describing the Bush administration’s willingness to involve
itself with scientific decisions).
8. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is within the Executive Office of the
President. See Peter L. Strauss et al., Gellhorn and Byse’s Administrative Law: Cases
and Comments 213 (11th ed. 2011). Today, White House review of agency regulations is
conducted by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), which is part of OMB.
See id. at 214. For one recent account of OIRA’s role that was written by a former Administra-
tor of OIRA, see Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and
Realities, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1838 (2013).
9. See infra Section I.B.2 (describing President Obama’s influence over the regulatory
state).
10. See infra Section I.B.2.
11. See, e.g., Gautham Nagesh & Brody Mullins, Blindsided: How White House Thwarted
FCC Chief on Net Rules, Wall St. J., Feb. 5, 2015, at A1; Michael D. Shear, Obama Moves
Ahead on Immigration: Asserting Power While Daring the G.O.P., N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 2014, at
A1; Craig Whitlock, Rules on Use of Drones Unveiled, Wash. Post, Feb. 16, 2015, at A1.
12. Net Neutrality: President Obama’s Plan for a Free and Open Internet, White House,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/net-neutrality [http://perma.cc/2LCN-RT4Z] (setting forth
Obama’s plan for how the Federal Communications Commission should regulate net
neutrality).
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has openly and aggressively sought to influence or outright control regula-
tory policy, frequently harnessing social media to maximize the impact of
his efforts.15
Both Bush’s and Obama’s efforts to steer regulatory policy highlight just
how complex presidential control has become. Not only does it operate in
covert and overt ways, but it is exerted through a variety of different tools.
Some of these tools, such as presidential directives and speeches made read-
ily available via social media, can help to further key values, including politi-
cal accountability and regulatory coherence. Yet other tools, including more
veiled OMB review and behind-closed-door communications, may under-
mine transparency and the rule of law, taint agency science, and cast doubt
on the legitimacy of agencies’ decisions.
As of now, administrative law has failed to take the complexity and vari-
ety of presidential control into account. Indeed, administrative law doctrine
has not adapted to presidential control in any meaningful way. This Article
aims to move administrative law forward in this area, exploring how a vari-
ety of nonconstitutional administrative law doctrines can and should re-
spond to the new status quo.16 While numerous scholars have weighed in on
long-standing debates about the constitutionality of presidential attempts to
control the executive branch17 and whether the Constitution demands that
13. On February 15, 2015, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) released details
concerning proposed drone regulations. Overview of Small UAS Notice of Proposed Rulemak-
ing (proposed Feb. 15, 2015), http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/media/0215
15_sUAS_Summary.pdf [http://perma.cc/V9RM-2WGS]. That same day, Obama issued a
presidential memorandum in which he called on federal agencies to develop drone-related
policies ensuring the protection of privacy and civil liberties. Presidential Memorandum: Pro-
moting Econ. Competitiveness While Safeguarding Privacy, Civil Rights, & Civil Liberties in
Domestic Use of Unmanned Aircraft Sys., 2015 Daily Comp. Pres. Doc. (Feb. 15, 2015),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/15/presidential-memorandum-promot
ing-economic-competitiveness-while-safegua [http://perma.cc/MY4Y-56RK].
14. The President Speaks on Fixing America’s Broken Immigration System, White House
(Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/2014/11/20/president-
speaks-fixing-americas-broken-immigration-system [http://perma.cc/X3G6-6FGK] (announc-
ing a plan to allow certain groups of undocumented immigrants to stay temporarily without
the risk of deportation).
15. See infra Section I.B.2.c.
16. This Article’s focus is on presidential control over the rulemaking process, and ac-
cordingly, it does not focus on congressional control. See generally Jack M. Beermann, Con-
gressional Administration, 43 San Diego L. Rev. 61 (2006) (studying Congress’s role in
influencing and controlling agencies). Nor does this Article directly analyze presidential con-
trol over agencies’ adjudicatory decisions or their enforcement decisions—although both adju-
dication and enforcement will surface to the degree that they sometimes overlap with agency
rulemaking. See infra Section II.A (discussing the FDA’s regulation of Plan B, which involved
flavors of both rulemaking and adjudication); see also infra notes 393–397 and accompanying
text (discussing Obama’s involvement in directing DHS’s enforcement priorities in the immi-
gration arena).
17. See, e.g., Robert V. Percival, Who’s in Charge? Does the President Have Directive Au-
thority over Agency Regulatory Decisions?, 79 Fordham L. Rev. 2487 (2011) (summarizing
debate over whether the Constitution requires that the President possess directive authority);
Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President in Administrative Law, 75 Geo.
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the President have authority over all executive actors,18 scholars have given
little attention to analyzing how nonconstitutional administrative law princi-
ples could be used to respond to the new realities of presidential control.19
This Article represents the first attempt to set forth a legal framework for
how a variety of nonconstitutional administrative law doctrines can be coor-
dinated to enhance the positive and restrain the negative aspects of presiden-
tial control.20 It identifies three relevant doctrinal categories: (1) “statutorily
facing” rules, which would clarify when, as a matter of statutory construc-
tion, the President may either direct or more softly influence agencies’ dis-
cretionary decisions; (2) “transparency-enhancing” mechanisms, which
would both incentivize disclosure of presidential control and penalize agen-
cies for hiding presidential influences; and (3) “process-forcing” rules de-
signed to ensure that presidential influence does not undermine the notice-
and-comment process. These three doctrinal categories provide a powerful
and much-needed roadmap for responding to many current controversies
swirling around presidential control, including Obama’s recent efforts to in-
fluence the FCC’s net neutrality rules and his executive action in the immi-
gration arena.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I briefly describes how Presi-
dents Reagan and Clinton played key roles in laying the foundation for
strong presidential control over the administrative state. Then—drawing on
the recent experiences of the George W. Bush and Barack Obama pre-
sidencies—Part I shows how presidential control has evolved and deepened
Wash. L. Rev. 696, 759–60 (2007) (arguing that the President has the constitutional responsi-
bility to oversee agencies but not to directly make decisions for agencies).
18. Compare Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive:
Presidential Power from Washington to Bush (2008) (advocating for the “unitary execu-
tive” theory), with Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration,
94 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1994) (arguing against the notion that the framers constitutionalized a
unitary vision of the executive).
19. Outside of the constitutional law context, a few scholars, including the author of this
Article, have analyzed how one discrete doctrinal area or another could respond to political
control over the regulatory state. See, e.g., Christopher F. Edley, Jr., Administrative Law:
Rethinking Judicial Control of Bureaucracy 169–202 (1990) (exploring hard-look re-
view); Margaret Gilhooley, Executive Oversight of Administrative Rulemaking: Disclosing the
Impact, 25 Ind. L. Rev. 299, 301 (1991) (advocating for disclosure rules); Kagan, supra note 1,
at 2372–83 (focusing on Chevron deference and hard-look review as a means of enhancing
presidential administration); Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing “Political” Oversight of Agency De-
cision Making, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 1127 (2010) (arguing for ex ante disclosure rules); Kathryn
A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 Yale L.J. 2
(2009) (focusing on arbitrary-and-capricious review). These scholars, however, have not con-
sidered how disparate doctrines might work together to form a more coordinated response to
presidential control—one that elevates the positive and minimizes the negative aspects of pres-
idential control, which is one of the main goals of this Article.
20. Kagan focuses on analyzing how administrative law doctrines—namely, Chevron and
hard-look review—could promote presidential control. See Kagan, supra note 1, at 2363,
2372–83 (“[C]ourts should attempt, through their articulation of administrative law, to recog-
nize and promote this kind of [presidential] control over agency policymaking.”). She does not
focus on how administrative law doctrines might both promote the positive and restrain the
negative aspects of presidential control, as this Article does.
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over time, turning into an entrenched feature of the regulatory state that
transcends party lines. Part II analyzes three case studies from the Bush and
Obama administrations, illustrating how presidential control involves a
complex mix of both positive and negative attributes. Part III critiques as
inadequate the most prevalent reaction both inside and outside of the courts
to presidential control—a reflexive kind of “expertise forcing”21 that simplis-
tically views political influence as “suspect” and expert-driven decisionmak-
ing as “good.” Finally, Part IV sets forth a powerful new roadmap for how
different administrative law doctrines can be coordinated to control—but
not unnecessarily constrain—presidential control.
I. The Entrenchment of Presidential Control
As a result of important work by Kagan and other scholars, the story
surrounding presidential control through the end of Clinton’s presidency is
now well known.22 But legal scholars have yet to give much attention to
presidential control during the two most recent presidencies—those of
George W. Bush and Barack Obama. This Part begins by briefly recounting
the now-familiar narrative of how Presidents from Nixon through Clinton
laid the foundation for strong presidential control over the regulatory state.
Then it tells the next and less-familiar chapter of the story, describing how
presidential control evolved post-Clinton, during both the Bush and Obama
presidencies. As this Part demonstrates, presidential control now constitutes
an entrenched feature of the regulatory state, transcending party lines.
A. Early Presidential Responses to Rulemaking’s Rise
As rulemaking surged in the 1960s and 1970s and we turned from an
age of statutes to an era of regulation,23 Presidents quickly recognized that
21. In using the term “expertise forcing,” this Article borrows from a phrase originally
coined by Professors Freeman and Vermeule in the context of assessing the Supreme Court’s
opinion in Massachusetts v. EPA. Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v EPA:
From Politics to Expertise, 2007 Sup. Ct. Rev. 51, 52 (describing the Supreme Court’s split 5-4
decision in Massachusetts as a specific example of judicial “expertise forcing” whereby courts
seek to push for apolitical, expert-driven agency decisions).
22. See Kagan, supra note 1, at 2274–309 (documenting how Reagan and Clinton played
key roles in catapulting presidential administration to prominence); see also Harold H. Bruff,
Presidential Management of Agency Rulemaking, 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 533 (1989) (describing
Reagan’s role in establishing presidential management over agency rulemaking).
23. See Cornelius M. Kerwin & Scott R. Furlong, Rulemaking: How Government
Agencies Write Law and Make Policy 14 (4th ed. 2011) (“The number of statutes [in the
1970s] that established major programs requiring extensive rulemaking was unprecedented.”);
Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Power Meets Bureaucratic Expertise, 12 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 461,
469 (2010) (“In the 1970s, Presidents began taking an active role in managing regulation.”);
Peter L. Strauss, From Expertise to Politics: The Transformation of American Rulemaking, 31
Wake Forest L. Rev. 745, 755 (1996) (“The period beginning with the election of John F.
Kennedy and running through the Nixon-Ford administration marked a tremendous expan-
sion in the ambition of American government and, in particular, in the prominence, use, and
development of rulemaking.”).
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unelected officials were making inherently political policy judgments of
great national importance outside of the usual legislative process.24 In re-
sponse, Presidents began to try to exert more and more influence over agen-
cies’ regulatory decisions through a variety of mechanisms.25 As this Section
describes, the first major mechanism to take hold was White House review
of agency rules—often referred to today as “OMB review” because it is con-
ducted by the Office of Management and Budget. Two additional tools for
exerting presidential control gained prominence during the Clinton presi-
dency: presidential directives and presidential attempts to personally claim
ownership of agencies’ decisions.
1. White House Review of Agency Rules via OMB
White House review of agency rules is the initial mechanism that Presi-
dents developed to exert control over the rulemaking apparatus.26 Presidents
Nixon,27 Ford,28 and Carter29 all planted early seeds for White House review
of agency rules. Yet, in retrospect, it was Reagan’s inauguration that brought
about a new era of presidential control.30 In February 1981, Reagan issued
Executive Order 12,291.31 Reagan’s order implemented an ambitious pro-
gram for White House oversight of regulation that was unprecedented in its
scale,32 tasking the director of OMB with taking the lead in overseeing fed-
eral regulation.33 For example, Reagan’s order directed executive agencies to
evaluate proposed major rules according to regulatory impact analyses—
24. Strauss, supra note 23, at 758 (“[T]he new political importance of rulemaking . . .
generat[ed] increased presidential and congressional interest in controlling [rulemaking]
outcomes.”).
25. This is not to say that Presidents had never previously tried to exert any control over
the regulatory state. They had. Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House
Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1075, 1075 (1986) (“Since the earliest days of
the Republic, presidents have taken the steps they deemed necessary to maintain some control
over the activities of the executive branch . . . .”).
26. Bruff, supra note 23, at 484.
27. Nixon did so through what was called “Quality of Life” review, a program an-
nounced in 1971 that focused almost exclusively on interagency review of proposed EPA regu-
lations. See Bruff, supra note 22, at 546–47, 546 n.80.
28. Ford did so via his “Inflation Impact Statement” program, which called on agencies
to prepare Inflation Impact Statements for the Executive Office of the President outlining the
costs of rules. See id. at 547.
29. See Exec. Order No. 12,044, § 3, 3 C.F.R. 152, 154 (1979) (requiring agencies to
prepare regulatory analyses for significant regulations that might have a major impact on the
economy).
30. Kagan, supra note 1, at 2277 (noting that a “sea change” began with Reagan’s
inauguration).
31. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982).
32. Bruff, supra note 22, at 549; see Kagan, supra note 1, at 2277.
33. See Bruff, supra note 22, at 550; supra note 8 and accompanying text (explaining that
OMB sits within the Executive Office of the President).
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analyses that were to be transmitted to OMB for its review.34 His order also
specified certain substantive criteria for agency rulemakings, requiring exec-
utive agencies (to the extent permitted by law) to consider cost-benefit prin-
ciples when promulgating regulations.35 Four years after issuing Executive
Order 12,291, Reagan issued Executive Order 12,498, which required agen-
cies to submit annual regulatory plans listing proposed actions to OMB for
its review, thereby expanding OMB’s reach to the pre-rulemaking process.36
Although Reagan’s centralized White House review program stirred up
a great deal of controversy,37 Republican President George H.W. Bush re-
tained both of Reagan’s executive orders when he entered the White House
in 1989.38 And when Democratic President Clinton entered the White House
in 1993, he too retained many of Reagan’s key concepts, such as cost-benefit
analyses and regulatory planning, when he issued his own order—Executive
Order 12,866.39 Indeed, in issuing Executive Order 12,866, not only did
Clinton retain many elements of Reagan’s order, but he articulated an even
“stronger view than [Reagan] had of the President’s authority over the ad-
ministrative state.”40 Clinton’s order, for instance, charged both independent
and executive agencies with preparing regulatory plans that set forth the
agency’s “regulatory objectives and priorities and how they relate to the
President’s priorities.”41 His order also spelled out a process for resolving
any conflicts between executive agencies and OMB, expressly giving the
President, or the Vice President acting at the request of the President, the
ultimate authority to resolve such disagreements.42
As Kagan notes, Clinton’s order said something significant about the
changing “nature of the relationship between the agencies and the Presi-
dent.”43 Whereas Presidents before Reagan had generally “shunned” direct
involvement in agency rulemaking proceedings (and even Reagan had dis-
claimed any ability to directly displace the judgment of agency officials), the
34. 3 C.F.R. at 128 (1982) (“[A]gencies shall prepare Regulatory Impact Analyses of ma-
jor rules and transmit them, along with all notices of proposed rulemaking and all final rules,
to the Director . . . .”).
35. E.g., id. (“Regulatory action shall not be undertaken unless the potential benefits to
society for the regulation outweigh the potential costs to society . . . .”).
36. Exec. Order No. 12,498, § 1(a), 3 C.F.R. 323, 323 (1986).
37. See, e.g., Morton Rosenberg, Presidential Control of Agency Rulemaking: An Analysis of
Constitutional Issues that May Be Raised by Executive Order 12,291, 23 Ariz. L. Rev. 1199, 1200
(1981); see also Kagan, supra note 1, at 2279 (noting that the Reagan oversight program “pro-
voked sharp criticism, most of which related to perceptions of the scheme’s anti-regulatory
bias”).
38. Kagan, supra note 1, at 2281.
39. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at
76 (1994).
40. Kagan, supra note 1, at 2285.
41. 3 C.F.R. at 642 (1994).
42. Id. at 648.
43. Kagan, supra note 1, at 2289–90.
March 2016] Controlling Presidential Control 691
Clinton order assumed presidential power over “discretionary decisions as-
signed by Congress to specified executive branch officials.”44 Whereas Rea-
gan often tried “to veil his and his staff’s influence over administration,”45
Clinton’s order quite openly asserted the authority to make discretionary
decisions delegated to agencies,46 helping to project the notion that agencies
“were [the President’s] and so too were their decisions.”47
2. Presidential Directives and Personal Appropriation
Clinton also developed additional means of exerting control. In particu-
lar, as Kagan details, Clinton relied heavily on presidential “directives” and
public “appropriation” of agency action to help project the sense that agen-
cies were an extension of the White House.48
First, Clinton regularly published formal memoranda—called direc-
tives—that publicly directed agencies to propose or adopt rules addressing
specific domestic policy issues.49 Although both Reagan and George H.W.
Bush issued some directives during their presidencies,50 it was Clinton who
brought prominence to this practice.51 For example, during a single three-
month period in 1999, Clinton, among other things, directed the Secretary
of Labor to propose a regulation involving unemployment, directed the pro-
mulgation of a rule to “enhance environmental protection of the nation’s
waters,” and directed the adoption of “new standards and enforcement poli-
cies to enhance the safety of imported foods.”52
Second, in addition to relying heavily on directives, Clinton frequently
asserted personal ownership of—or tried to “appropriate”—agency action.53
Again, Clinton was not the first President to try to publicly claim credit for
certain administrative actions, but, as Kagan describes, “ ‘Clinton set a new
44. Id.
45. Id. at 2333.
46. Id. at 2289–90.
47. Id. at 2290.
48. See id. at 2290–303 (describing Clinton’s reliance on directives and his frequent ap-
propriation of agency action).
49. Id. at 2290.
50. Robert V. Percival, Presidential Management of the Administrative State: The Not-So-
Unitary Executive, 51 Duke L.J. 963, 996 (2001) (“Presidents Reagan and George H. W. Bush
had issued only nine and four presidential directives, respectively, to executive agencies—three
of these instructed agencies to delay or halt the issuance of regulations.”); see also Kathryn A.
Watts, Regulatory Moratoria, 61 Duke L.J. 1883, 1890–97 (2012) (describing moratoria on
rulemaking that both Reagan and George H.W. Bush ordered during their presidencies).
51. Bruff, supra note 23, at 470 (“President Clinton brought to prominence a practice
that his successors have continued, of direct presidential intervention to spur an agency to take
a particular policy initiative.”).
52. Kagan, supra note 1, at 2295.
53. Id. at 2299–300.
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standard’ in communicating directly with the public.”54 He did this “event
after event, speech after speech” by claiming “ownership of administrative
actions, presenting them to the public as his own—as the product of his
values and decisions.”55 One high-profile example involves Clinton’s very
public ownership of the FDA’s attempts to curb teen smoking.56 Not only
did Clinton publicly direct the FDA to promulgate rules on the subject, but
he also presided over a Rose Garden ceremony announcing the FDA’s final
rules—a ceremony that the press widely covered.57
Just as with Clinton’s heavy reliance on directives, Clinton’s frequent,
“nakedly assertive,”58 and political attempts to appropriate agency action
took place in the public eye. This enabled Clinton to further his political
agenda and public image and to develop greater public understanding of the
President’s role in the regulatory process, contrasting markedly with the
more veiled OMB review process that Reagan institutionalized.
B. Modern Presidential Control Under George W. Bush
and Barack Obama
While the surge in presidential control that occurred up through Clin-
ton is now well known, what has happened during the two most recent
presidencies—those of Bush and Obama—is not as familiar. This Section
picks up there, describing both Bush’s and Obama’s approaches to exerting
control over the regulatory state.
As this Section demonstrates, Bush—consistent with prior Republican
Presidents like Reagan and George H.W. Bush—relied quite heavily on
OMB review throughout his presidency, and his administration also demon-
strated a willingness to quietly influence agencies’ scientific decisions.59
Obama too has relied on OMB review.60 In addition, Obama—taking a cue
from Clinton—has tried to turn the regulatory state into a very public ex-
tension of his own political agenda. He has extensively used presidential di-
rectives and appropriation of regulatory action, often leveraging online
media tools to help project the sense that he owns the regulatory state.61
54. Id. at 2300 (quoting Lawrence R. Jacobs & Robert Y. Shapiro, The Politicization of
Public Opinion: The Fight for the Pulpit, in The Social Divide: Political Parties and the
Future of Activist Government 83, 96 (Margaret Weir ed., 1998)).
55. Id.
56. See The President’s News Conference, 2 Pub. Papers 1237 (Aug. 10, 1995) (announc-
ing Clinton’s efforts to personally “restrict sharply the advertising, promotion, distribution,
and marketing of cigarettes to teenagers”); see also Watts, supra note 19, at 23 (noting that
“Clinton played a very active role in directing” the FDA’s rulemaking).
57. See, e.g., Peter T. Kilborn, Clinton Approves a Series of Curbs on Cigarette Ads, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 24, 1996, at 1.
58. Kagan, supra note 1, at 2333.
59. See infra Section I.B.1 (discussing Bush’s efforts to control the regulatory state).
60. See infra Section I.B.2 (discussing Obama’s efforts to control the regulatory state).
61. See infra Section I.B.2.
March 2016] Controlling Presidential Control 693
1. George W. Bush
Upon entering the White House, Bush immediately made clear that he
planned to exert significant control over the regulatory state. Like Reagan
and Clinton did during their presidencies, Bush issued a memorandum or-
dering a temporary moratorium on rulemaking “[i]n order to ensure that
the President’s appointees ha[d] the opportunity to review any new or pend-
ing regulations” from the previous administration.62 This memorandum
served as an early sign that Bush planned to take a watchful and restrained
approach to regulation, and it helped to solidify a place for regulatory mora-
toria in the presidential toolbox.63
As Bush’s presidency progressed, two primary characteristics of his ap-
proach to controlling the regulatory state emerged: (1) extensive reliance on
OMB; and (2) a willingness to allow his administration to become involved
in agencies’ scientific decisions. As this Section describes, much of this con-
trol operated behind the scenes. Unlike Clinton, Bush generally did not pub-
licly claim ownership of agency decisions. Instead, Bush’s preferred brand of
presidential control mainly involved covert control rather than overt
command.
a. A Heavy Reliance on OMB and a Corresponding Lack of
Personal Ownership
Perhaps the most notable aspect of Bush’s approach to presidential con-
trol involved his heavy reliance on OMB. When he entered the White House
in 2001, Bush kept Executive Order 12,866 in place, leaving OMB—and
more specifically, the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA)
that sits within OMB64—with a significant role in overseeing and coordinat-
ing the regulatory process. Bush, however, eventually made several major
changes to Executive Order 12,866—changes that brought even more regula-
tory activity within the reach of OMB review and thus within the reach of
the White House since OMB sits within the Executive Office of the Presi-
dent.65 For example, Bush expanded Executive Order 12,866’s reach to in-
clude significant agency guidance documents.66 In addition, Bush mandated
that each agency designate “one of the agency’s Presidential Appointees to be
62. Memorandum for the Heads and Acting Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies, 66 Fed.
Reg. 7702, 7702 (Jan. 24, 2001) [hereinafter Regulatory Review Plan]. All Presidents beginning
with Reagan, except George H.W. Bush, have issued short-term regulatory moratoria immedi-
ately upon entering office to enable review of their predecessors’ regulations. See Watts, supra
note 50, at 1885–86. George H.W. Bush issued a moratorium closer to the end of his presi-
dency, not at the beginning.
63. See Regulatory Review Plan, supra note 62.
64. See supra note 8 (describing how OIRA is part of OMB).
65. Exec. Order No. 13,422, §§ 5(b), 7, 3 C.F.R. 191, 193 (2008); see also supra note 8
and accompanying text.
66. Id. § 7.
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its Regulatory Policy Officer.”67 Among other things, an agency’s Regulatory
Policy Officer had to approve all agency rulemaking before it commenced,68
leading to the further politicization of the rulemaking process.
Throughout his presidency, Bush relied heavily on OIRA to actively
manage agencies’ rulemakings.69 Bush’s OIRA, for instance, developed a
“new tool called the ‘prompt’ letter,”70 which served as a means of “high-
light[ing] issues that may warrant the attention of regulators” and
“bring[ing] issues to the attention of agencies in a transparent manner that
permits public scrutiny and debate.”71 In the first two out of fifteen publicly
posted prompt letters issued by OIRA during the Bush administration,72
OIRA prompted the Department of Health and Human Services and the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration to give greater priority to
two lifesaving issues: “the labeling of trans fatty acid content in foods [and
the] use of automated external defibrillators (AEDs) in the workplace.”73
Subsequent prompt letters involved a variety of issues, ranging from dietary
guidelines to pollution from diesel engines.74
OIRA under Bush also issued twenty-seven “return” letters75 and fifteen
“review” letters to agencies.76 “Return” letters are letters from OIRA to an
agency requesting that the agency reconsider a particular draft rule for a
variety of possible reasons, such as OIRA’s determination that the rule is not
67. Id. § 5(b).
68. Id. § 4(b).
69. John D. Graham et al., Managing the Regulatory State: The Experience of the Bush
Administration, 33 Fordham Urb. L.J. 953, 971–74 (2006) (describing OIRA’s “more proac-
tive role” under Bush).
70. Id. at 972.
71. Press Release, Office of Mgmt. & Budget, OMB Encourages Lifesaving Actions by
Regulators (Sept. 18, 2001), http://www.reginfo.gov/public/prompt/2001-35.html [http://
perma.cc/56ES-4GXU]. OIRA’s statement that prompt letters were designed to enable “public
scrutiny” fits with OIRA Administrator John Graham’s overall efforts to strengthen trans-
parency during the Bush administration. See Memorandum from John D. Graham, Adm’r,
Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to OIRA Staff (Oct. 18, 2001), http://www.whitehouse.
gov/omb/inforeg/oira_disclosure_memo-b.html [https://perma.cc/UP78-C32L] (“[T]he trans-
parency of OIRA’s regulatory review process is critical to our ability to improve the nation’s
regulatory system.”). But as Professor Mendelson points out, despite Graham’s emphasis on
transparency, OIRA’s record of disclosure was less than stellar during the Bush years. See
Mendelson, supra note 19, at 1150–51. Mendelson, for example, describes how “review” and
“return” letters released by the Bush administration did not speak to a large “portion of the
‘economically significant’ rules reviewed and changed during the OIRA review process.” Id.
72. See OIRA Prompt Letters, Off. Info. & Reg. Aff., http://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/
EO/PromptLetters.jsp [http://perma.cc/MU5U-43SL].
73. Press Release, Office of Mgmt. & Budget, supra note 71.
74. See OIRA Prompt Letters, supra note 72.
75. See OIRA Return Letters, Off. Info. & Reg. Aff., http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/
eoReturnLetters [http://perma.cc/5YQR-FRPX].
76. See Review Letters, Off. Info. & Reg. Aff., http://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/EO/
postReviewLetters.jsp [http://perma.cc/MHP4-9XGY].
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“consistent . . . with the President’s policies and priorities.”77 “Review” let-
ters, in contrast, are letters OIRA issued at different stages of the rulemaking
process; they might offer advice, urge an agency to consider alternatives, or
request that the agency perform additional regulatory analysis.78
Despite these attempts at transparency, with few exceptions the prompt,
return, and review letters issued by OIRA during the Bush years spoke in
highly technical terms and did not connect the President or political influ-
ences directly to OIRA’s regulatory review process.79 The letters also “con-
cern[ed] only a small portion of the ‘economically significant’ rules
reviewed and changed during the OIRA review process, and an even smaller
portion of all such rules reviewed by OIRA” during the Bush administra-
tion.80 Furthermore, Bush did not regularly make speeches or announce-
ments—as Clinton did—claiming personal credit for various regulatory
actions. Thus, Bush’s preferred brand of presidential control involved more
covert control than overt command.
As one illustrative example, consider what happened in the wake of the
Supreme Court’s 2007 decision on global warming, Massachusetts v. EPA.81
In Massachusetts, the Court held in a politically charged 5-4 decision that the
EPA possessed statutory authority under the Clean Air Act to regulate cer-
tain emissions from new motor vehicles, and that the EPA’s policy-driven
reasons for declining to regulate were inadequate.82 After the Court handed
down its decision, the EPA went back to the drawing board, drafting a 300-
page document that proposed emission regulations.83 When the EPA emailed
the draft rule to OIRA for pre-rulemaking review, the EPA met resistance: in
an attempt to avoid triggering docketing requirements,84 OIRA refused to
77. OIRA Letters, Off. Info. & Reg. Aff., http://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/EO/letters
.jsp [http://perma.cc/692R-ANFA].
78. Id.
79. One notable exception exists. See Letter from Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory
Affairs, to Envtl. Prot. Agency, Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking “Regulating Green-
house Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act” (July 10, 2008), http://www.reginfo.gov/public/
postreview/OIRA_letter_to_EPA_7_10_08.pdf [http://perma.cc/BTT5-LHHN] (noting the
President’s view that important decisions involving global warming should be made by elected
officials, not by unelected bureaucrats).
80. Mendelson, supra note 19, at 1150–51 (“[D]espite the several hundred economically
significant rules that were modified during the review process, the Bush Administration OMB
posted only forty-two review and return letters that explain its problems with the agency rule
under review.”).
81. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
82. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 497.
83. Heidi Kitrosser, Accountability and Administrative Structure, 45 Willamette L. Rev.
607, 608 (2009) (describing the Bush administration’s response to the Court’s Massachusetts
decision).
84. See Lisa Heinzerling, Inside EPA: A Former Insider’s Reflections on the Relationship
Between the Obama EPA and the Obama White House, 31 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 325, 332 (2014)
(explaining OIRA’s docketing requirements).
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open the EPA’s email and demanded its retraction.85 Notably, all of this took
place out of the public eye. Indeed, the public learned of OIRA’s refusal to
open the email message through a New York Times story published six
months after the incident.86 When Congress caught wind, it sought access to
“the e-mail and related communications,” but the White House balked and
“claimed executive privilege.”87
As another example of the Bush White House’s hesitancy to publicly
claim credit for agencies’ decisions, consider how Bush-era agencies issued
significant proposed and final rules right before or after major holidays,
such as Thanksgiving and Christmas, when the public’s attention was di-
verted elsewhere.88 In particular, the Bush administration quietly issued
more than 280 proposed and final regulations in the holiday period between
December 23, 2002 and January 3, 2003—about 120 to 160 more rules than
the Bush administration issued in an average week. This total significantly
exceeded “the Clinton Administration’s last minute attempts in December
2000 through January 2001 to force federal regulations through the publish-
ing process.”89 One of these Bush-era rules—issued on Christmas Eve in
2002—“repealed Clinton-era protections against road-building and allowed
claimants to use an 1866 mining-related statute to open up new roads in
federal protected areas.”90 As Robin Kundis Craig suggests, this holiday tim-
ing seems to have been purposefully designed to help the Bush administra-
tion “avoid public scrutiny of and debate over its regulatory policies.”91
b. A Willingness to Influence Scientific Decisions
A second noteworthy aspect of Bush’s approach to controlling the regu-
latory state was his administration’s willingness to play a direct role in scien-
tific decisions.92 For instance, in 2003, EPA documents suggested that the
85. Felicity Barringer, White House Refused to Open E-mail on Pollutants, N.Y. Times,
June 25, 2008, at A15; Juliet Eilperin, White House Tried to Silence EPA Proposal on Car Emis-
sions; Agency Was Responding to Ruling About Clean Air Act, Wash. Post, June 26, 2008, at A2;
Kitrosser, supra note 83, at 608–09.
86. See Barringer, supra note 85 (“The refusal to open the e-mail has not been made
public.”); see also Eilperin, supra note 85 (“The New York Times reported Wednesday that
White House officials never opened EPA’s e-mail.”).
87. Kitrosser, supra note 83, at 609.
88. Robin Kundis Craig, The Bush Administration’s Use and Abuse of Rulemaking, Part II:
Manipulating the Federal Register, Admin. & Reg. L. News, Fall 2003, at 5, 6, 15.
89. Id. at 6.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 15 (“[The Bush administration’s] controversial regulations are hidden in mas-
sive Federal Register publications immediately before and after major holidays, when public
attention is diverted.”).
92. See Strauss et al., supra note 8, at 690 (“[T]he [George W. Bush] Administration
was plagued with recurring criticism that political appointees interfered with the work of gov-
ernment scientists . . . .”); Sidney A. Shapiro, “Political” Science: Regulatory Science After the
Bush Administration, 4 Duke J. Const. L. & Pub. Pol’y 31, 32 (2009) (“One of the primary
ways that the Bush Administration has interfered with agency science has been to change
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Bush White House “attempted to rewrite an EPA report to play down the
risks of global warming.”93 In 2004, more than sixty prominent scientists,
including twenty Nobel laureates, asserted that “the Bush administration . . .
systematically distorted scientific fact in the service of policy goals on the
environment, health, biomedical research and nuclear weaponry.”94 The
group of scientists cited “significant evidence that the scope and scale of the
manipulation, suppression and misrepresentation of science by the Bush ad-
ministration is unprecedented.”95 Subsequently, in 2005, a NASA official ac-
cused the administration of trying to keep him from discussing the effects of
global warming.96 Furthermore, an associate FDA commissioner who retired
in 2005 asserted that “top Bush administration officials were so reflexively
opposed to nearly all regulations that even when consumer groups, industry
associations, scientists and drug agency officials all agreed that new rules
were needed, top officials rejected them.”97
This scientific interference—which was widely reported by the news
media98—was unprecedented; no prior President faced such widespread
charges of regular interference with agencies’ scientific decisions.99 Indeed,
after Bush left office, the New York Times described Bush’s presidency as
representing “eight years of stark tension between science and
government.”100
The Bush administration disputed charges that it sought to meddle with
agencies’ scientific decisions,101 so it is admittedly difficult to say with cer-
tainty the precise degree to which the Bush administration actually engaged
scientific results or to repress them.”); see also Michele Estrin Gilman, The President as Scien-
tist-in-Chief, 45 Willamette L. Rev. 565, 569 (2009) (“Scientists and the media have raised
dozens of allegations of scientific interference by the Bush Administration.”).
93. Jeremy Symons, Opinion, How Bush and Co. Obscure the Science, Wash. Post, July
13, 2003, at B04.
94. James Glanz, Scientists Say Administration Distorts Facts, N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 2004,
at A18; see also Guy Gugliotta & Rick Weiss, President’s Science Policy Questioned; Scientists
Worry that Any Politics Will Compromise Their Credibility, Wash. Post, Feb. 19, 2004, at A02.
95. Union of Concerned Scientists, Scientific Integrity in Policymaking: An In-
vestigation into the Bush Administration’s Misuse of Science 2 (2004), http://www.ucs
usa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/scientific_integrity/rsi_final_fullreport_
1.pdf [http://perma.cc/2EYB-5AZ3].
96. Juliet Eilperin, Putting Some Heat on Bush; Scientist Inspires Anger, Awe for Challenges
on Global Warming, Wash. Post, Jan. 19, 2005, at A17.
97. Gardiner Harris & William J. Broad, Scientists Welcome Administration’s Words but
Must Wait for Action, N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 2009, at A23.
98. See supra notes 93–97 and accompanying text; see also Gilman, supra note 92, at
604–05 (“[T]he media took an active interest in the Bush Administration’s politicization of
science.”).
99. Cf. Gilman, supra note 92, at 565 (noting the Union of Concerned Scientists’ view
that the Bush administration engaged in scientific interference more systematically and widely
than any other administration).
100. Harris & Broad, supra note 97.
101. E.g., Andrew C. Revkin, Bush’s Science Aide Rejects Claims of Distorted Facts, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 3, 2004, at A9.
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in widespread interference with scientific decisions. Nonetheless, it seems
clear that the White House’s willingness to meddle with at least some scien-
tific decisions served as yet another mechanism through which presidential
control occurred during the Bush administration.
2. Barack Obama
When Barack Obama entered the White House in 2009, he responded to
the widespread charges of scientific interference that had been levied against
the Bush administration by promising in his inaugural address to “restore
science to its rightful place.”102 Soon thereafter he issued a memorandum on
“Scientific Integrity.”103 In addition, he quickly revoked Bush’s Executive Or-
der 13,422, restored Executive Order 12,866 to its earlier form under Clin-
ton,104 and ordered his OMB director to undertake an assessment of the
regulatory review process with the goal of producing recommendations for a
new order on regulatory review.105 Thus, many hoped that Obama’s admin-
istration would approach the regulatory state with a softer touch than the
Bush administration did.106
Yet, now that the first seven years of Obama’s presidency are behind us,
it is clear that—although Obama has not faced the same kinds of wide-
spread charges of scientific interference that Bush did—Obama has exerted
significant control over the regulatory state through other mechanisms. In-
deed, if anything, Obama has elevated White House control over agencies’
regulatory activity to its highest level ever, relying on a mix of covert control
and overt command. Obama has done this by leveraging existing tools for
regulatory control like OMB review and presidential directives and develop-
ing new tools, including the exploitation of online media and so-called
White House “czars.”
a. Heavy Reliance on OMB Review
When Obama began his presidency by ordering his OMB director to
produce recommendations for a new Executive Order on regulatory
102. Inaugural Address, 1 Pub. Papers 2 (Jan. 21, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/
inaugural-address [http://perma.cc/2FTQ-DMDZ].
103. Memorandum from Office of the Press Sec’y for the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts and Agen-
cies (Mar. 9, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Memorandum-for-the-
Heads-of-Executive-Departments-and-Agencies-3-9-09/ [http://perma.cc/L8CG-9VBM].
104. Exec. Order No. 13,497, 3 C.F.R 218 (2010).
105. Memorandum for the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 5977, 5977
(Feb. 3, 2009) (“I therefore direct the Director of OMB, in consultation with representatives of
regulatory agencies, as appropriate, to produce within 100 days a set of recommendations for a
new Executive Order on Federal regulatory review.”).
106. Cf. Heinzerling, supra note 84, at 338 (“The assertiveness and opacity of OIRA dur-
ing the George W. Bush administration led many to hope that when Barack Obama came into
office, things would change for the better.”).
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review,107 some hoped that the new order would cut back on strong presi-
dential control. That did not prove to be the case. Indeed, when Obama
finally issued Executive Order 13,563 in January 2011,108 he merely supple-
mented and reaffirmed the principles of Clinton’s Executive Order 12,866.109
Little that Obama set forth in Executive Order 13,563 was new.110 Nonethe-
less, Obama—much like Bush—has heavily depended on OMB review. In-
deed, Obama has relied on OMB even more intensely—and even more
controversially—than Clinton did.111
Two aspects of Obama’s aggressive approach to OMB review are nota-
ble. First, under Obama, OIRA has seized on delay as a significant means of
aggressively controlling the regulatory state112—delay that often extends far
beyond the presumptive ninety-day period of review set forth in Executive
Order 12,866.113 According to Lisa Heinzerling, who worked for the EPA
from January 2009 to December 2010, under the Obama administration,
OIRA has thwarted regulatory activity by silently sitting on rules,114 and, in
some cases, delaying initiation of the review process by refusing to accept
draft rules from agencies.115 Other Obama officials have reported similar
concerns about delay. For example, in 2013, several Obama officials reported
to the Washington Post that they were instructed to hold off on submitting
proposed rules to OMB for review to avoid controversy prior to the 2012
election.116 According to these Obama officials, the stalled rules included
regulations involving “crucial elements of the Affordable Care Act, what
107. Memorandum for the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. at 5977.
108. Exec. Order 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215 (2011), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 103–04
(2013).
109. Id. § 1(b) (“This order is supplemental to and reaffirms the principles, structures,
and definitions governing contemporary regulatory review that were established in Executive
Order 12866 of September 30, 1993.”).
110. Heinzerling, supra note 84, at 340–41 (“The single most notable fact about the new
order, EO 13,563, is how not-new it was . . . .”).
111. Id. at 333 (“[I]t seems fair to say—certainly in retrospect—that the Clinton years
were relatively quiet [and controversy-free] ones for OIRA review.”).
112. See Lisa Heinzerling, A Pen, a Phone, and the U.S. Code, 103 Geo. L.J. Online 59,
60–61 (2014) (“A 2013 report published for the Administrative Conference of the United
States found that the average from 1994 to 2011 for the length of an OIRA review was 50 days.
Yet the average period for such review in 2012 was 79 days, and the average for the first half of
2013 was 140 days. As of February 18, 2014, 114 rules were under review, and 58 (over half)
had been there more than 90 days. About one-third of the rules (17 in total) had been there
for over six months. One had languished at OIRA since 2010.” (footnotes omitted)).
113. Executive Order 12,866 established a presumptive ninety-day period for OMB re-
view, with an extension to 120 days if both the agency and OMB agree. Exec. Order No.
12,866, § 6(b)(2), 3 C.F.R. 638, 647 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 76 (1994).
114. Heinzerling, supra note 112, at 61 (“[W]e have direct evidence that some rules have
been not only delayed, but stopped.”).
115. Heinzerling, supra note 84, at 359.
116. Juliet Eilperin, White House Delayed Enacting Rules Ahead of 2012 Election to Avoid
Controversy, Wash. Post (Dec. 15, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/white-
house-delayed-enacting-rules-ahead-of-2012-election-to-avoid-controversy/2013/12/14/7885a
494-561a-11e3-ba82-16ed03681809_story.html [http://perma.cc/XRE2-LG2G] (“The White
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bodies of water deserved federal protection, pollution control for industrial
boilers and limits on dangerous silica exposure in the workplace.”117 Statis-
tics support these officials’ anecdotal descriptions of delay: According to a
detailed study performed by Curtis Copeland for the Administrative Confer-
ence of the United States, “[f]rom 1994 through 2011, the average amount of
time it took to complete a review was 50 days, and the highest average re-
view time in any year was 62 days.”118 Yet “in 2012, the average time for
OIRA to complete reviews increased to 79 days, and in the first half of 2013,
the average review time was 140 days – nearly three times the average for the
period from 1994 through 2011.”119
Second, much like the Bush administration,120 the Obama administra-
tion has not followed various transparency requirements set forth in Execu-
tive Order 12,866, such as the requirement that documents exchanged
between OMB and the agency during review are to be made publicly availa-
ble at the end of the rulemaking.121 Heinzerling’s experiences working for
the Obama administration’s EPA have led her to conclude that OMB “does
not explain in writing to agencies that items on their regulatory agenda do
not fit with the President’s agenda,” and it does not “keep a publicly availa-
ble log explaining when and by whom disputes between the OMB and the
agencies were elevated.”122 Indeed, with one notable exception, OMB has not
returned rules to agencies with a public explanation of why the rules have
not passed OMB review.123 Thus, the Obama administration has used OMB
review as a form of covert control.
b. Extensive Reliance on Directives
Other aspects of Obama’s approach to controlling the regulatory state
have been much more transparent, falling into the category of overt control.
In particular, Obama—like Clinton—has relied extensively on presidential
directives.124 Such directives generally have taken the form of written
House systematically delayed enacting a series of rules on the environment, worker safety and
health care to prevent them from becoming points of contention before the 2012 election.”).
117. Id.
118. Curtis W. Copeland, Length of Rule Reviews by the Office of Information and Regu-




120. See supra notes 79–85 and accompanying text.
121. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, §§ 6(b)(4)(C)–(D), 3 C.F.R. 638, 647–48 (1994).
122. Lisa Heinzerling, Who Will Run the EPA?, 30 Yale J. on Reg. Online 39 (2013).
123. The exception involves Obama’s withdrawal of the EPA’s ozone standards via a writ-
ten return letter from OIRA. See infra Section II.B.
124. See Gregory Korte, Obama Issues “Executive Orders by Another Name”, USA Today
(Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/12/16/obama-presiden-
tial-memoranda-executive-orders/20191805/ [http://perma.cc/ZDB7-PS8M] (“Obama has
made prolific use of memoranda despite his own claims that he’s used his executive power less
than other presidents.”).
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memoranda posted to WhiteHouse.gov and published in the Federal
Register.125
Consider just two illustrative examples—both of which were issued in
the first few weeks of Obama’s presidency. First, just days after entering the
White House, Obama tackled the issue of fuel-efficiency standards for model
year 2011 passenger cars and light trucks, requesting that the Department of
Transportation (DOT) finalize fuel-efficiency standards.126 Obama publicly
announced this directive “at the White House while flanked by the head of
the DOT, as well as other key members of his energy and environment
teams.”127 Second, on February 5, 2009, Obama issued a memorandum that
“requested” that the Department of Energy (DOE) finalize legally required
efficiency standards for a broad class of residential and commercial
products.128
Obama’s heavy use of directives has continued throughout his presi-
dency. In the first seven months of 2014 alone, Obama did as follows: gave a
public speech about retirement savings while surrounded by steel workers in
Pennsylvania and signed a memorandum that directed the Secretary of Trea-
sury to create a myRA retirement program;129 gave a public speech at a
Safeway Distribution Center in Maryland and issued a written report di-
recting the EPA and DOT to issue new fuel efficiency standards for heavy
125. They differ in form from the OIRA prompt, review, and return letters that Bush
frequently relied on as a means of proactively steering agency regulation. See supra text accom-
panying notes 69–78. Indeed, under Obama, OIRA has publicly issued just one review letter
and just one return letter. See Review Letters, supra note 76 (listing one Obama-era review
letter from 2010); OIRA Return Letters, supra note 75 (listing one Obama-era return letter
from 2011). Obama’s OIRA has not publicly issued any prompt letters to agencies. See OIRA
Prompt Letters, supra note 72 (listing zero Obama-era prompt letters).
126. See Average Fuel Economy Standards Passenger Cars and Light Trucks Model Year
2011, 74 Fed. Reg. 14,196 (Mar. 30, 2009) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 523, 531, 533, 534,
536, 537).
127. Watts, supra note 19, at 27; see also John M. Broder & Peter Baker, Obama’s Order
Likely to Tighten Auto Standards, N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 2009, at A1; Steven Mufson & Juliet
Eilperin, Obama Issues Orders Toward More Fuel-Efficient Cars, Wash. Post, Jan. 27, 2009, at
A4. Not surprisingly, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) heeded
Obama’s directions, promptly issuing final standards for model year 2011 in March 2009 and
even citing his January 2009 memorandum. See Average Fuel Economy Standards Passenger
Cars and Light Trucks Model Year 2011, 74 Fed. Reg. at 14,196.
128. Appliance Efficiency Standards, 74 Fed. Reg. 6537 (Feb. 9, 2009).
129. Presidential Memorandum on Retirement Sav. Sec. to Sec’y of the Treasury, 2014
Daily Comp. Pres. Doc. 1 (Jan. 29, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/
01/28/presidential-memorandum-retirement-savings-security [https://perma.cc/TSB4-MUU6]
(directing Treasury to “finalize the development of a new retirement savings security that can
be made available through employers to their employees”); Remarks by the President on Retire-
ment, White House (Jan. 29, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/
2014/01/29/remarks-president-retirement-security# [https://perma.cc/3SXZ-DR7C]. Treasury
followed through, ultimately promulgating a final rule in December 2014. Regulations Gov-
erning Retirement Savings Bonds, 79 Fed. Reg. 74,023 (Dec. 15, 2014) (noting that the final
rules are in response to the President’s directive).
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trucks;130 delivered a speech at the White House about the importance of
raising minimum wages and then issued an Executive Order requiring that
the minimum wage for workers on new federal contracts be raised;131 di-
rected the Secretary of Labor to update overtime pay provisions;132 directed
various federal agencies to improve the entry process for international arriv-
als via a presidential memorandum;133 gave a speech at the White House
about making college more affordable and signed a memorandum directing
the Department of Education to change its regulations governing the repay-
ment of student debt;134 and issued an Executive Order that prohibited dis-
crimination based on gender identity and sexual orientation in federal
employment.135 These directives illustrate how Obama—taking a cue from
130. Improving the Fuel Efficiency of American Trucks, White House 7 (Feb. 2014), http://
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/finaltrucksreport.pdf [http://perma.cc/6AG3-
9J9H]; President Obama Speaks on Improving Fuel Efficiency for American Trucks, White
House (Feb. 18, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/2014/02/18/presi-
dent-obama-speaks-improving-fuel-efficiency-american-trucks#transcript [https://perma.cc/
9N79-RG2J].
131. Exec. Order 13,658, 79 Fed. Reg. 9851 (Feb. 20, 2014) (requiring federal contractors
to pay their federally funded employees on new contracts a fair wage of at least $10.10 an
hour); President Obama Speaks on Raising the Minimum Wage, White House (Feb. 12, 2014),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/2014/02/12/president-obama-speaks-
raising-minimum-wage#transcript [http://perma.cc/96X9-VHKP] (delivering speech at the
White House about raising the minimum wage). The Department of Labor complied with
Obama’s directions, issuing a final rule in October 2014 that establishes a minimum wage for
federal contractors. Establishing a Minimum Wage for Contractors, 79 Fed. Reg. 60,634 (Oct.
7, 2014).
132. Presidential Memorandum on Updating and Modernizing Overtime, 2014 Daily
Comp. Pres. Doc. (Mar. 13, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/03/13/
presidential-memorandum-updating-and-modernizing-overtime-regulations [https://
perma.cc/Q9HX-TCPF].
133. Presidential Memorandum on Establishing a Nat’l Goal and Developing Airport Spe-
cific Action Plans to Enhance the Entry Process for Int’l Travelers to the U.S., 2014 Daily
Comp. Pres. Doc. 1 (May 22, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/05/22/
presidential-memorandum-establishing-national-goal-and-developing-airpor [http://
perma.cc/6JBP-Q3PS] (directing agencies to “remove barriers to traveler entry while continu-
ing to protect our national security, public health, and safety”).
134. Remarks on Signing a Memorandum on Helping Struggling Federal Student Loan
Borrowers Manage Their Debt, 2014 Daily Comp. Pres. Doc. 4 (June 9, 2014), http://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/06/09/remarks-president-opportunity-all-making-
college-more-affordable [http://perma.cc/KJU2-TF3L] (“I’m directing our Secretary of Educa-
tion, Arne Duncan, to give more Americans who are already making their loan payments a
chance to cap those payments at 10 percent of their income.”); Memorandum on Helping
Struggling Federal Student Loan Borrowers Manage Their Debt, 2014 Daily Comp. Pres.
Doc. 1 (June 9, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/06/09/presidential-
memorandum-federal-student-loan-repayments [http://perma.cc/5MUN-CKU2] (“Within 1
year . . . the Secretary of Education shall propose regulations that will allow additional stu-
dents who borrowed Federal Direct Loans to cap their Federal student loan payments at 10
percent of their income.”).
135. Exec. Order No. 13,672, 79 Fed. Reg. 42,971 (July 23, 2014) (issuing order to “pro-
hibit discrimination and take further steps to promote economy and efficiency in Federal
Government procurement by prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation and gen-
der identity”).
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Clinton—relied extensively on positive command to turn the administrative
state into an extension of the White House.
c. Public Appropriation Using Online Media
Obama has heavily used yet another tool to exert overt control over the
regulatory state: online media. Clinton had to rely on the mainstream media
to spread his message and to publicly appropriate agency action.136 Obama,
however, has leveraged WhiteHouse.gov, his own online videos, social me-
dia, Tumblr, and blog posts to publicly appropriate agency decisions to an
unprecedented degree, demonstrating that executive agencies are simply a
reflection of his own policies and goals.137
As just one example, consider a thirty-seven-page written report posted
to WhiteHouse.gov at the end of 2014 titled: “Year of Action: A Final Pro-
gress Report on the Obama Administration’s Actions to Help Create Oppor-
tunity for All Americans.”138 The report details more than eighty “executive
actions” the Obama administration took in 2014, and it notes that the ac-
tions were designed to “help grow the economy, create jobs, address the
threat of climate change, and strengthen the middle class.”139 The clear in-
tent of the report is to help Obama project the sense that—despite congres-
sional inaction140—he is taking action through the regulatory state. Tellingly,
the report sometimes omits the names of the relevant agencies involved,
speaking instead of “the Administration” in a generic fashion so as to blur
the line between the relevant agency and the Obama administration more
generally.141
136. Cf. Drake Martinet, Egypt, Al Gore and the .XXX Domain—Bill Clinton Keynotes
ICANN in San Francisco, All Things Digital (March 17, 2011, 1:34 AM), http://allthingsd.
com/20110317/egypt-al-gore-and-the-xxx-domain-bill-clinton-keynotes-icann-in-san-fran
cisco/ [http://perma.cc/7Q87-PFGX] (noting Clinton’s comment that he became President at
the “dawn of the Internet age,” entering the presidency at a time when only fifty websites
existed).
137. See, e.g., The Official White House Tumblr, Tumblr, http://whitehouse.tumblr.com/
[http://perma.cc/AH5Z-JMPU] (“Things going around the White House that we just had to
share with you.”); The White House Blog, White House, http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog
[http://perma.cc/8535-8XXX] (providing White House blog posts about presidential activity).
138. White House, Year of Action: A Final Progress Report on the Obama Ad-




140. Cf. Michael D. Shear, For Obama, More Audacity and Fulfillment of Languishing
Promises, N.Y. Times (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/18/us/politics/cuba-
action-is-obamas-latest-step-away-from-a-cautious-approach.html [http://perma.cc/4LAG-
TLNB] (“Frustrated by congressional inaction and Republican efforts to block legislation, the
president has increasingly pushed the limits of his executive authority in domestic and interna-
tional policy making . . . .”).
141. See, e.g., White House, supra note 138 (“President Obama directed the Administra-
tion to set new standards to cut fuel use and carbon pollution from medium and heavy-duty
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Obama’s report was accompanied by an online video showing Obama
talking about the executive actions he took during the year and by “share-
able graphics and tweets” to make it easy for others “to help spread the
word.”142 This reliance on online media pervades his attempts to claim own-
ership over the regulatory state and to project the sense that even though
Congress failed to get things done, he was moving the ball forward through
his executive actions. In June 2014, for example, when Obama posted a
memorandum to WhiteHouse.gov directing the Department of Education to
propose regulations that would allow student loan borrowers to cap their
student loan payments,143 his administration simultaneously posted a video
of Obama speaking passionately about the issue of student debt on the
White House blog.144 Prominently posted on the left side of the blog post
were various “share buttons,” enabling easy sharing of the post via email,
Twitter, and Facebook.145
d. Regulatory Czars
Finally, Obama also has brought prominence to one more tool for exert-
ing control over the regulatory state: the appointment of “regulatory czars”
to White House policy positions. What czars do and exactly who czars are is
difficult to state with precision because the actual title of “czar” does not
technically exist.146 Rather, the term is used loosely (often by the media and
by presidential critics) to refer to a diverse groups of presidential advisors—
many of whom do not go through the Senate confirmation process. Al-
though czars have “solid roots in earlier administrations,” Obama has used
regulatory czars more heavily than other Presidents.147 Obama’s czars, tasked
with overseeing policy in particular substantive areas,148 have included,
vehicles.”); id. (noting that the “President prioritized the allocation of scarce enforcement re-
sources” in the immigration arena but failing to note that the actual enforcement priorities
were put into place by a Department of Homeland Security memo, not via any written presi-
dential order).
142. Year of Action, White House, http://www.whitehouse.gov/year-of-action [https://
perma.cc/9QUL-2GTW].
143. See supra note 134 and accompanying text (noting the President’s memorandum on
student loans).
144. David Hudson, President Obama on Student Loan Debt: “No Hardworking Young Per-
son Should Be Priced Out of a Higher Education”, White House (June 9, 2014, 6:59 PM), http:/
/www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/06/09/president-obama-student-loan-debt-no-hardworking-
young-person-should-be-priced-out-h [https://perma.cc/TU2C-EHR6].
145. Id. (providing “share buttons” to enable the President’s message to spread through
social media).
146. Anita Dunn, The Truth About “Czars”, White House (Sept. 16, 2009, 3:21 PM),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/The-Truth-About-Czars [http://perma.cc/2EH9-EWCB].
147. See Strauss et al., supra note 8, at 761.
148. Aaron J. Saiger, Obama’s “Czars” for Domestic Policy and the Law of the White House
Staff, 79 Fordham L. Rev. 2577, 2582–83 (2011) (noting that Obama’s czars are “at work in
the White House Office, tasked by the President to oversee policy in a particular substantive
area”).
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among many others, an AIDS czar, a Safe Schools czar, a Health czar, an
Energy and Environment czar, and an Auto Recovery czar.149 He also re-
cently appointed an Ebola czar.150
The Obama administration has downplayed the significance of
“czars;”151 however, legal scholars have taken a different stance, arguing that
Obama’s czars are “powerful, engaged in policy and not merely in public
relations.”152 Obama’s czars are of interest, in other words, because of “the
sort of policymaking they do” outside of the usual agency structure,153 help-
ing Obama to “advance ambitious policy agendas with respect to health
care, climate, urban affairs, and other matters.”154 Indeed, the White House
itself has expressly explained that some officials labeled by the press and
others as “czars” play a role in ensuring regulatory coherence, helping to
coordinate “the work of agencies on President Obama’s key policy priorities:
health insurance reform, energy and green jobs, and building a new founda-
tion for long-lasting economic growth.”155 In this sense, Obama’s czars seem
to serve as a structural solution to the compartmentalization of the Presi-
dent’s cabinet organization, helping to provide interagency coordination
and coherency in areas that require expertise across areas.
***
The tools available for presidential control are now numerous and in-
clude: White House review via OMB; presidential directives; personal own-
ership of agencies’ decisions; and the appointment of policy czars. While
Bush and Obama relied on a different mix of these tools in trying to exert
control over the regulatory state, both Presidents sought to exert significant
influence over regulatory activity. The experiences of the Bush and Obama
administrations, accordingly, help to demonstrate how presidential control
has indeed become an embedded feature of the regulatory state—just as
Kagan posited some fifteen years ago that it would.
The evolution of presidential control that occurred during the Bush and
Obama years also demonstrates the accuracy of another prediction Kagan
149. List of Obama Administration “Czars”, Fox News (Jan. 7, 2011), http://
www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/01/07/list-obama-administration-czars/ [http://perma.cc/
9JW3-KV2D].
150. Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Before Ebola, New Czar Handled Political Crises, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 18, 2014, at A12.
151. Dunn, supra note 146 (“Just to be clear, the job title ‘czar’ doesn’t exist in the Obama
Administration. Many of the officials cited [as czars] by conservative commentators have been
confirmed by the Senate. Many hold policy jobs that have existed in previous
Administrations.”).
152. Saiger, supra note 148, at 2582.
153. Id. at 2582.
154. Id. at 2612.
155. Dunn, supra note 146.
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made in 2001—namely, that future developments might necessitate a reas-
sessment of whether presidential control in fact represents a positive devel-
opment for the administrative state.156 The next Part of this Article turns to
this question, using three different case studies from the Bush and Obama
administrations to demonstrate that not all forms of presidential control are
equal. Today’s presidential control involves a complex mix of positive and
negative attributes.
II. Three Case Studies from the George W. Bush and
Barack Obama Administrations
This Part analyzes three high-profile case studies from the Bush and
Obama administrations—one involving the FDA’s regulation of the emer-
gency contraceptive Plan B;157 one involving the EPA’s regulation of ground-
level ozone;158 and one involving the FCC’s regulation of net neutrality.159
The three case studies help to demonstrate that not all forms of presidential
control are equal; some forms of presidential control promote positive val-
ues like political accountability and regulatory coherence, while other forms
taint agency science, prompt agencies to ignore the law, and undermine
transparency.
A. The FDA and Plan B: Covert Influence in a Scientific Arena
The FDA’s handling of “Plan B” illustrates how presidential control can
operate in a covert manner, casting a shadow on the legitimacy of agency
action and interfering with science. Plan B is an emergency contraceptive
that, if taken by a woman soon after intercourse, “can be used to reduce the
risk of unwanted pregnancy.”160 It works mainly by “stopping the release of
an egg from an ovary.”161 Although it may cause some short-term side ef-
fects like nausea and abdominal pain, it does not have any known serious or
long-term side effects.162
In 1999, the Clinton administration’s FDA approved Plan B for pre-
scription-only use in the United States.163 Subsequently, in 2001, a citizen
petition was filed with the Bush administration’s FDA requesting that it
156. See Kagan, supra note 1, at 2385.
157. See infra Section II.A.
158. See infra Section II.B.
159. See infra Section II.C.
160. Tummino v. Torti, 603 F. Supp. 2d 519, 522 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). For a thorough history
of the FDA’s handling of Plan B, see Lisa Heinzerling, The FDA’s Plan B Fiasco: Lessons for
Administrative Law, 102 Geo. L.J. 927 (2014).
161. Torti, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 522.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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make the drug available over the counter to women of all ages.164 The FDA
considered the citizen petition simultaneously with various Supplemental
New Drug Applications (SNDAs) filed by the drug’s maker seeking nonpre-
scription access to Plan B.165 Under the relevant statutory framework, the
key question confronting the FDA with respect to both the SNDAs and the
citizen petition was whether Plan B could be deemed “safe and effective” for
self-administration.166
After years went by without the Bush administration’s FDA taking any
action on the citizen petition, various individuals and organizations filed
suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York. The
plaintiffs challenged, among other things, the FDA’s failure to act on the
citizen petition.167 In 2006, while the lawsuit was pending, the FDA finally
took action, choosing to deny the citizen petition on the ground that the
“petitioners had failed to provide sufficient data or information to meet the
statutory and regulatory requirements for an OTC [over-the-counter] switch
for any age group, much less the under 16 age group.”168 Just about two
months later, however, the FDA announced that it would grant the drug
manufacturer’s application to make Plan B available without a prescription
to women over the age of eighteen.169
In light of the FDA’s denial of the citizen petition and its refusal to allow
over-the-counter access to Plan B for women under the age of eighteen, the
plaintiffs shifted their focus to whether the FDA’s decision was the product
of reasoned decisionmaking.170 In their amended complaint, the plaintiffs
alleged that the FDA’s decisions were improperly motivated by political con-
siderations outside the scope of the FDA’s statutory authority, and that “the
FDA bowed to political pressure from the White House and anti-abortion
constituents despite the uniform recommendation of the FDA’s scientific
review staff to approve over-the-counter access to Plan B” without age
limitation.171
164. Id. at 526 (noting that a citizen petition was filed in 2001); id. at 525 (noting that a
rulemaking to change a drug from prescription-only to nonprescription status can be initiated
by the Commissioner of the FDA or by any interested person who files a citizen petition).
165. Id. at 526–27 (describing the first SNDA filed by the drug’s maker). Although the
FDA’s review of SNDAs clearly involves an adjudicatory rather than a rulemaking process, the
FDA took the position that the citizen petitions involved rulemaking. See Tummino v.
Hamburg, 936 F. Supp. 2d 162, 197–98 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (noting the FDA’s argument that
rulemaking would be needed prior to action on the citizen petition).
166. Torti, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 524–25; see also 21 U.S.C. § 353(b)(3) (2006) (allowing the
FDA to remove prescription drugs from prescription status when prescription “requirements
are not necessary for the protection of the public health”); 21 C.F.R. § 330.10 (2006) (setting
forth regulations for classifying drugs as “safe and effective” for over-the-counter status).
167. See Tummino v. Von Eschenbach, 427 F. Supp. 2d 212, 216 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
168. Torti, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 536.
169. Id. at 535–36.
170. See id. at 538.
171. Id.
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In March 2009, Judge Edward Korman sided with the plaintiffs. Kor-
man, a Reagan appointee, ruled that the plaintiffs had “presented unrebut-
ted evidence of the FDA’s lack of good faith” during the Bush
administration and that the FDA’s actions were arbitrary and capricious.172
Korman concluded that “the [FDA] Commissioner did not make the deci-
sion on his own, but was pressured by the White House and ‘constituents
who would be very unhappy with . . . an over-the-counter Plan B.’ ”173 Kor-
man also noted testimony indicating that then-FDA Commissioner Dr.
Mark McClellan had discussed the pending application for nonprescription
status for Plan B with the deputy assistant to the President for domestic
policy at the Bush White House on the very same day that the first applica-
tion was filed, and then continued to provide “several updates on the Plan B
application to relevant policy staff at the White House.”174 In short, Korman
found that the FDA’s decisionmaking process was arbitrary and capricious
because the FDA’s scientific findings—which focused on whether Plan B was
“safe” and “effective” for self-administration—were trumped by political
interference.175
As a remedy, Korman ordered the FDA to make Plan B available to
women seventeen and older without a prescription, finding that further ad-
ministrative proceedings on that one issue were unnecessary given that the
FDA had offered no plausible justification for denying over-the-counter Plan
B to seventeen year olds.176 But with respect to Plan B’s nonprescription
status for those under seventeen, Korman chose to vacate the FDA’s denial
of the citizen petition and to remand the matter to the FDA for its
reconsideration.177
The task of responding to the March 2009 ruling fell to the newly
elected Obama administration. Yet, the citizen petition did not fare much
better under Obama’s FDA than it did under Bush’s FDA. The Obama ad-
ministration’s FDA sat on the citizen petition for nearly three years before
finally denying it in 2011.178 And when the FDA did deny the petition, its
denial—much like the FDA’s denial of it during the Bush years—seemed to
have been politically influenced.
The FDA’s denial of the citizen petition was ultimately driven by the
FDA’s rejection of an application filed by the drug’s manufacturer seeking
over-the-counter status for Plan B for women of all ages.179 The FDA re-
jected that application not because the FDA had independently concluded
172. Id. at 523, 544.
173. Id. at 546 (quoting Kweder Deposition at 56:21–22, in Plaintiffs’ Exhibit D-2).
174. Id. at 527.
175. See id. at 545–47.
176. Id. at 549–50.
177. Id. at 550.
178. Tummino v. Hamburg, 936 F. Supp. 2d 162, 169 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (“[T]he FDA had
sat on the Citizen Petition for three years.”).
179. Id.
March 2016] Controlling Presidential Control 709
based on the available scientific evidence that the application should be de-
nied, but rather because Kathleen Sebelius, the Secretary of Health and
Human Services for Obama, swept in and directed the FDA to deny the
application.180 The denial of the Citizen Petition came just five days after
Sebelius demanded that the drug application be denied.181
FDA Commissioner Margaret Hamburg complied with Sebelius’s direc-
tive, but not without voicing reluctance. Hamburg posted a response to
Sebelius’s directive on the FDA’s website, which stressed the robust scientific
findings and significant expertise that had gone into the FDA’s decisionmak-
ing process.182 Hamburg, for example, stressed that “[i]t is our responsibility
at FDA to approve drugs that are safe and effective for their intended use
based on the scientific evidence,” and she explained that experts inside and
outside the FDA had “reviewed the totality of the data and agreed that it met
the regulatory standard for a nonprescription drug and that Plan B One-
Step should be approved for all females of child-bearing potential.”183
Not surprisingly, controversy quickly erupted over what the media de-
scribed as Sebelius’s “unprecedented” decision to override the FDA’s sci-
ence-based findings.184 A New York Times article hinted at one possible
explanation, reporting that Sebelius’s decision “avoided what could have
been a bruising political battle over parental control and contraception dur-
ing a presidential election season.”185
Notably, Obama did not jump in and take ownership of Sebelius’s deci-
sion. To the contrary, although Obama and Sebelius had flown together on
Air Force One the day before Sebelius announced her Plan B decision, the
White House claimed that Obama and Sebelius did not discuss the issue at
any point.186 Indeed, Obama publicly stated that he “did not get involved in
the process” and that “[t]his was a decision that was made by Kathleen
180. Id. at 167.
181. Id. at 169.
182. Statement from FDA Commissioner Margaret Hamburg, M.D. on Plan B One-Step,
FDA (Dec. 7, 2011), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/ucm282805.htm [http://
perma.cc/X4YL-NAKE].
183. Id.
184. See Jennifer Corbett Dooren, Obama Health Chief Blocks FDA on “Morning After”
Pill, Wall St. J. (Dec. 8, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203413304
577084560710472558 [http://perma.cc/Z6UU-9MMN] (describing controversy surrounding
Sebelius’s “unprecedented” decision to overrule the FDA).
185. Gardiner Harris, F.D.A. Overruled on Availability of After-Sex Pill, N.Y. Times, Dec.
8, 2011, at A1 (“For the first time ever, the Health and Human Services secretary publicly
overruled the [FDA], refusing Wednesday to allow emergency contraceptives to be sold over
the counter, including to young teenagers.”).
186. Jackie Calmes & Gardiner Harris, Obama Endorses Decision to Limit Morning-After
Pill, N.Y. Times (Dec. 8, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/09/us/obama-backs-aides-
stance-on-morning-after-pill.html?pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc/W8JB-K8BA].
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Sebelius,” not by him.187 Nonetheless, Obama publicly endorsed Sebelius’s
decision after the fact, explaining at a press conference that “the reason
[Sebelius] made this decision was she could not be confident that a 10-year-
old or an 11-year-old [who] go[es] into a drugstore, should be able—along-
side bubble gum or batteries—be able to buy a medication that potentially,
if not used properly, could end up having an adverse effect.”188 He did not
elaborate on what those “adverse effects” might be.
Ultimately, the Obama administration’s denial of the citizen petition
ended up back before Judge Korman.189 He again ruled that the FDA’s denial
of the petition was arbitrary and capricious.190 While not directly deciding
whether Obama had personally influenced Sebelius’s decision, Korman did
note in his opinion that the secretary is a “member of the President’s cabi-
net” and that “the motivation for the Secretary’s action” made during an
“election-year” was “obviously political.”191
In short, from start to finish, the FDA’s handling of Plan B under both
the Bush and Obama administrations has been plagued by controversy sur-
rounding the proper line between expert-driven decisionmaking and politi-
cal influence. Notably, the White House’s influence over the FDA’s
regulation of Plan B operated in a clandestine manner during both the Bush
and the Obama administrations. Neither President issued a presidential di-
rective on the subject, and neither tried to publicly claim credit for the
FDA’s final decision.192 Indeed, much of the evidence of the Bush White
House’s role in the FDA’s decisionmaking process came to light only as a
result of discovery that was allowed in the course of the lawsuit filed in
Eastern District of New York.193 And Obama’s exact involvement in—or lack
of involvement in—Sebelius’s decision to override the FDA is still unclear.194
At a minimum, however, the FDA’s handling of Plan B demonstrates
how some kinds of presidential control—namely, more secretive and clan-
destine attempts to influence agency behavior—can play a delegitimizing
187. Remarks on Senate Actions to Block the Vote on the Nomination of Richard A. Cor-
dray to Be Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and an Exchange with Re-
porters, 2011 Daily Comp. Pres. Doc. (Dec. 8, 2011), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2011/12/08/statement-president [https://perma.cc/PM45-CCWX].
188. Id.
189. See Tummino v. Hamburg, 936 F. Supp. 2d 162, 165–66 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
190. Id. at 197.
191. Id. at 170.
192. See supra note 187 and accompanying text (noting that Obama claimed not to have
influenced Sebelius’s decision).
193. See Tummino v. Von Eschenbach, 427 F. Supp. 2d 212, 231–32 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (al-
lowing discovery beyond the administrative record because the court found that “a strong
preliminary showing of ‘bad faith or improper behavior’ ” had been made (quoting Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971))); see also Tummino v. Torti,
603 F. Supp. 2d 519, 527 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (referring to deposition testimony from Commis-
sioner McClellan).
194. Heinzerling, supra note 160, at 961 (“In the latest stages, involving Secretary Sebelius
and the Obama Administration, we do not have the kind of direct testimony that would allow
a conclusion, one way or another, on the fact or level of White House involvement.”).
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and corrupting role in the context of a decision that, under the relevant
statutory inquiry, involves an assessment of scientific evidence.195 By push-
ing the FDA to disregard scientific findings and to consider factors that were
not tied to the relevant statutory inquiry, presidential control tainted the
FDA’s decisional process and delegitimized the FDA’s actions.196
B. The EPA and Ozone Standards: Covert and Overt Pressure
As a second case study, consider the EPA’s efforts to set air quality stan-
dards governing ground-level ozone (sometimes referred to as smog) during
both Bush and Obama’s presidencies. Unlike the FDA’s regulation of Plan B,
this case study involves both overt command and covert control.
Ground-level ozone is created when man-made “pollutants emitted by
cars, power plants, industrial boilers, refineries, chemical plants, and other
sources chemically react in the presence of sunlight.”197 The Clean Air Act
requires the EPA to set primary and secondary National Ambient Air Qual-
ity Standards (NAAQS) for pollutants, such as ozone, that are considered
harmful to public health and welfare198 without taking costs into account.199
Under the terms of the CAA, both primary and secondary NAAQS must be
reviewed and, if appropriate, revised by the EPA every five years.200
In 2003, various environmental groups filed suit, challenging the Bush
administration’s failure to update the Ozone NAAQS as required by stat-
ute.201 Pursuant to a consent decree, the Bush administration issued final
ozone standards in March 2008,202 setting a primary standard of 0.075 parts
per million and an identical secondary standard.203 This was considerably
more lenient than the range that the Clean Air Scientific Advisory
Committee (“CASAC”) had recommended after its own scientific review of
the standards;204 CASAC “provides independent advice to the EPA
195. See supra note 166 and accompanying text (discussing the relevant statutory inquiry,
which turns on whether the drug is “safe and effective”).
196. See Louis J. Virelli III, Science, Politics, and Administrative Legitimacy, 78 Mo. L. Rev.
511, 514 (2013) (“HHS’ decision [to override the FDA on Plan B] is a clear example of politics
operating at the expense of science.”).
197. Frequent Questions, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/ozonedesignations/faq.htm#where
[http://perma.cc/4SDM-F8X9]; see also Mississippi v. EPA, 744 F.3d 1334, 1340 (D.C. Cir.
2013).
198. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408–09 (2012).
199. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 486 (2001).
200. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d)(1).
201. Christopher D. Ahlers, Presidential Authority over EPA Rulemaking Under the Clean
Air Act, 44 Envtl. L. 31, 41–42 (2014).
202. Mississippi, 744 F.3d at 1340.
203. National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 73 Fed. Reg. 16,436 (Mar. 27,
2008).
204. See Mississippi, 744 F.3d at 1340–41 (noting that the EPA acknowledged “that
CASAC had recommended a level as low as 0.060 to 0.070 ppm”).
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Administrator on the technical bases for EPA’s national ambient air quality
standards.”205
Exactly how and why the EPA settled on 0.075 as the standard for both
primary and secondary ozone standards was shrouded in some mystery.206
After the EPA’s final rule issued, evidence emerged that the final rule that
the EPA had sent to Bush’s OIRA for White House review differed from the
final rule ultimately published by the EPA; the EPA’s initial draft of the final
rule set different primary and secondary standards,207 but Bush, through
OIRA, overruled that decision at the eleventh hour via OIRA.208
As reports of the Bush administration’s last-minute interference sur-
faced, critics quickly argued that the Bush administration had improperly
meddled with the EPA’s decisionmaking domain. For example, a House
committee promptly held a hearing to “examine the EPA’s rejection of rec-
ommendations from its independent science advisors and the role of the
White House in the recent setting of ozone air quality standards.”209 And the
press alleged that Bush had “meddl[ed]” with science and had “overruled
officials” at the EPA to weaken the smog standards.210
205. EPA Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee, EPA, http://yosemite.epa.gov/sab/sab
people.nsf/WebCommittees/CASAC [http://perma.cc/AQW3-C797].
206. See Percival, supra note 17, at 2520–21 (describing the rushed and last minute nature
of the EPA’s about-face on the ozone rule).
207. Juliet Eilperin, Ozone Rules Weakened at Bush’s Behest, EPA Scrambles to Justify Ac-
tion, Wash. Post, Mar. 24, 2008, at A1; see Memorandum from Susan E. Dudley, Office of
Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to Adm’r, Envtl. Prot. Agency 1 (Mar. 6, 2008), http://www.reginfo.
gov/public/postreview/Steve_Johnson_Letter_on_NAAQs_final_3-13-08_2.pdf [http://perma.
cc/4BTB-JUJN] (“Under the draft, EPA would establish, for the first time, a secondary stan-
dard for ozone (based on ‘public welfare’) that is different from the primary standard that the
draft would establish (based on ‘public health’).”).
208. Percival, supra note 17, at 2520–21 (discussing the last minute nature of Bush and
OIRA’s decision to reverse the EPA given that EPA was under a deadline to finalize the new
Ozone standards by March 12, 2008, which was the very date the reversal decision was com-
municated to EPA by OIRA); see Letter from Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to Stephen L.
Johnson, Adm’r, Envtl. Prot. Agency 1 (Mar. 12, 2008), http://www.reginfo.gov/public/postre
view/Steve_Johnson_Letter_on_NAAQs_final_3-13-08_2.pdf [http://perma.cc/4BTB-JUJN]
(“The President has concluded that . . . the secondary ozone standard [should be set] identical
to the new primary standard . . . .”).
209. EPA’s New Ozone Standards: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Re-
form, 110th Cong. 1–3 (2008) (opening statement of Rep. Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, H.
Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform) (describing the impetus for the hearing as the disregard
of science by the Bush Administration on multiple occasions, including the decision to reverse
the EPA on the setting of secondary ozone NAAQS); id. at 7 (opening statement of Rep.
Darrell E. Issa, Ranking Member, H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform) (describing the
impetus of the hearing as looking into the actions of the administration with regards to the
ozone standards).
210. Eilperin, supra note 207; Deborah Zabarenko, Ozone Case Shows Bush Meddling in
Science: Watchdogs, Reuters (Mar. 14, 2008, 9:16 PM), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2008/03/
14/us-bush-idUKN1441222820080314 [http://perma.cc/443Q-6FDG].
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After various petitions challenging the EPA’s 2008 standards were filed
in federal court,211 the EPA, then under the newly elected Obama adminis-
tration, agreed to reconsider the Bush administration’s NAAQS. Based on its
reconsideration of the ozone standards, the Obama administration’s EPA
eventually proposed new ozone standards in 2010.212 These new proposed
standards recommended that the primary standard, which was set at 0.075
parts per million (ppm) in the 2008 final rule, “should instead be set at a
lower level within the range of 0.060 to 0.070 ppm, to provide increased
protection for children and other ‘at risk’ populations.”213 With regard to the
secondary standard, the EPA proposed “a new cumulative, seasonal stan-
dard” expressed as a rather complicated annual concentration-weighted in-
dex.214 After publishing the proposed rule in the Federal Register, holding
public hearings, and soliciting public comments, the EPA created a draft of a
final rule and transmitted that draft to OIRA for review.215
While the EPA’s draft of its final rule was under review by OIRA, vari-
ous business and environmental lobbyists worked the White House. In Au-
gust 2011, for example, the head of the American Petroleum Institute
brought maps to a meeting at the White House “showing the areas that
would be out of compliance with the proposed regulation in a vivid swatch
of red states across the Midwest and along the East Coast, states that [Presi-
dent] Obama won in 2008.”216 The same day, public health and environ-
mental groups also gathered at the White House for a meeting, emphasizing
the adverse health effects of ozone.217 Richard Daley, Obama’s chief of staff,
reportedly asked in response: “What are the health impacts of
unemployment?”218
Just weeks later, on September 1, 2011, Obama called Lisa Jackson, the
head of the EPA at the time, into his office and directed her to withdraw the
211. See Mississippi v. EPA, 744 F.3d 1334, 1342 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (noting that petitions
for review were filed by several states, the District of Columbia, New York City, and several
industry, environmental, and public health groups).
212. See National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 75 Fed. Reg. 2938 (proposed
Jan. 19, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 50, 58).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. See National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, EPA-HQ-OAR-2005-0172 &
FRL-RIN 2060-AP98 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 50, 58), http://www.epa.gov/glo/pdfs/
201107_OMBdraft-OzoneNAAQSpreamble.pdf [http://perma.cc/KM72-HBWF] (publishing a
copy of the rule EPA sent to OIRA for review under Executive Order 12,866); Letter from Cass
R. Sunstein, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to Lisa Jackson, Adm’r, Envtl. Prot.
Agency (Sept. 2, 2011), http://www.reginfo.gov/public/return/EPA_Return_Letter_9-2-
2011.pdf [http://perma.cc/CV7K-9E52] (noting that the EPA had sent its draft final rule to
OIRA for review).
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ozone standards.219 He reportedly told her that the EPA would have an op-
portunity to revisit the standards in 2013 if he was elected to a second term
but not right then, given that the President was in the midst of a reelection
campaign.220
Although Obama’s meeting with Jackson took place behind closed
doors, the President claimed ownership of the EPA’s decision to withdraw
the ozone rules, issuing a public statement that explained that he had per-
sonally requested that the EPA Administrator “withdraw” the draft ozone
NAAQS.221 He justified the withdrawal by noting that work was “already
underway to update a 2006 review of the science that will result in the re-
consideration of the ozone standard in 2013.”222 As he explained, he could
not “support asking state and local governments to begin implementing a
new standard that will soon be reconsidered.”223
That same day, Cass Sunstein, the administrator of OIRA at the time,
issued a formal return letter to the EPA—the only return letter that OIRA
has publicly issued to date during the Obama administration. Sunstein
stressed, among other things, that finalizing a new standard was not
mandatory at that time given that the Act sets out a five-year cycle of review,
which would not compel the EPA to revisit the standards again until 2013.224
Notably, Sunstein’s letter did not mention the election as a reason for post-
poning action. But his letter did make it crystal clear that it was the Presi-
dent who had directed the return of the rule to the EPA: “The President has
instructed me to return this rule to you for reconsideration. He has made it
clear that he does not support finalizing the rule at this time.”225
The EPA promptly complied with the President’s wishes and withdrew
its proposed standard—although allegedly not before Lisa Jackson consid-
ered resigning in protest.226 The EPA’s withdrawal of the proposed ozone
NAAQS was then challenged in federal court. In February 2012, the D.C.
Circuit determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the challenge because
the EPA had merely “postponed” consideration of the ozone standard and
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Statement on the Ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standards, 2011 on Helping
Struggling Federal Student Loan Borrowers Manage Their Debt, 2014 Daily Comp. Pres.




224. Letter from Cass R. Sunstein to Lisa Jackson, supra note 215, at 1.
225. Id. (emphasis added).
226. Josh Margolin, EPA Chief on Verge of Quitting After Obama Rejected Pollution Propo-
sal, N.Y. Post (Sept. 19, 2011, 4:00 AM), http://nypost.com/2011/09/19/epa-chief-on-verge-of-
quitting-after-obama-rejected-pollution-proposal/ [http://perma.cc/CJ29-6RJG].
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there was no “final” agency action to review.227 Thus, while Obama’s deci-
sion was subject to review by the voters through the normal political pro-
cess,228 the President’s involvement in the withdrawal was immune from
judicial review.
The EPA did not revisit the ozone standards again until November
2014—right after the midterm election—when it issued new draft ozone
standards that proposed to revise the primary standard to a level within the
range of 0.065 to 0.070 ppm, and to revise the secondary standard to within
the range of 0.065 to 0.070 ppm as well.229 The timing of this announcement
led Republicans to charge that the Obama “White House played politics by
waiting until after the election to release the rule and by announcing it the
day before Thanksgiving.”230
As this Section has demonstrated, however, the EPA’s handling of the
ozone NAAQS has involved politics during both the Republican Bush ad-
ministration and the Democratic Obama administration. The main differ-
ence between the Bush and Obama administration’s efforts to exert political
influence over the EPA’s ozone NAAQS is that Bush operated largely
through OMB, consistent with Bush’s general preference for covert con-
trol.231 In contrast, Obama’s decision to order the EPA to withdraw its pro-
posed NAAQS in 2011 was very public; Obama’s own written statement and
OIRA’s return letter made it crystal clear that Obama personally decided to
pull the plug on new ozone NAAQS at that time.232 Thus, in the end,
Obama’s overt command to the EPA enabled the public to understand the
President’s role and to give him credit for—or alternatively to blame him
for—the decision in the midst of his reelection campaign. In this sense, even
though Obama’s public explanation did not fess up to the role that the
looming election played in his decision, Obama’s open involvement in with-
drawing the ozone NAAQS did enhance political accountability and trans-
parency, enabling the public to see the President’s fingerprints all over the
EPA’s withdrawal.
227. See Mississippi v. EPA, No. 08-1200 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 17, 2012) (“The court lacks juris-
diction over the agency’s non-final decision to defer action on the 2008 voluntary revision of
the national ambient air quality standards for ozone.”).
228. Just a year after ordering withdrawal of the smog rule, Obama was reelected to a
second term. Jonathan Weisman, Obama’s Night: Tops Romney for 2nd Term in Bruising Run;
Democrats Turn Back G.O.P. Bid for Senate, N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 2012, at A1.
229. National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 79 Fed. Reg. 75,234, 75,234 (pro-
posed Dec. 17, 2014).
230. Ben Wolfgang, Obama’s Latest Regulatory Power Grab Aims at Ozone, Wash. Times
(Nov. 26, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/nov/26/obama-formally-pro-
poses-new-smog-ozone-standards/?page=all [http://perma.cc/D8TP-9HRT].
231. See, e.g., Yuka Umemoto Taylor, Note, With Great Power Comes Clear Accountability:
Presidential Influence over the Ozone NAAQS Reconsideration, 42 Envtl. L. Rep. 10978, 10980
(2012) (noting that “the George W. Bush Administration covertly influenced NAAQS for both
particulate matter (PM) and ozone”).
232. See supra notes 219–225 and accompanying text.
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Obama’s involvement also arguably furthered efficiency and coordina-
tion values to the extent that Obama looked broadly at the ideal timing of
new ozone NAAQS and the impact that promulgating new NAAQS would
have on “state and local governments.”233 Furthermore, in deciding that
2011 was not the appropriate time to set new ozone NAAQS, Obama pub-
licly emphasized the need to “reduc[e] regulatory burdens and regulatory
uncertainty, particularly as our economy continues to recover.”234 Hence,
Obama put his own views about ensuring regulatory efficiency and reducing
regulatory burdens out on the table for all to see and for the public to judge.
In contrast, Bush’s style of covert command hid the President’s involve-
ment from the public eye, raising questions about the legitimacy of the
EPA’s decisionmaking process. This helped to fuel concerns that Bush’s ad-
ministration was surreptitiously trying to undermine the agency’s scientific
findings, or that it was pushing the agency to consider factors, such as costs,
that were precluded from consideration by the statutory scheme.235
C. The FCC and Net Neutrality: Leveraging Online Media Tools to
Publicly Exert Pressure
As a third case study, consider Obama’s attempts to influence a recent
and very high-profile rulemaking proceeding conducted by the FCC involv-
ing the issue of “net neutrality,” or how best to protect and promote an
open Internet.236 The FCC initiated its net neutrality rulemaking proceeding
in May 2014.237 The issue received significant public attention after John
Oliver addressed the topic on his show Last Week Tonight in June 2014. Oli-
ver urged viewers to “turn on caps lock” and send comments to the FCC,
leading the FCC’s comment system to crash due to a flood of new
comments.238
By the end of the four-month comment period, the FCC received nearly
4 million comments, with most strongly favoring net neutrality.239 Even
233. Statement by the President on the Ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standards,
supra note 221.
234. Id.
235. See supra notes 201–210 and accompanying text (describing controversy that erupted
over the Bush administration’s involvement in the EPA’s ozone NAAQS).
236. See Net Neutrality: President Obama’s Plan for a Free and Open Internet, supra note 12
(detailing Obama’s own plan for net neutrality).
237. See FCC Launches Broad Rulemaking to Protect and Promote the Open Internet, FCC
(May 15, 2014), http://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-launches-broad-rulemaking-protect-and-
promote-open-internet; [http://perma.cc/BT44-EX8V]; see also Fact Sheet: Protecting and Pro-
moting the Open Internet, FCC (May 15, 2014), http://www.fcc.gov/document/fact-sheet-pro
tecting-and-promoting-open-internet [https://perma.cc/VS5Z-3UXF].
238. See Soraya Nadia McDonald, John Oliver’s Net Neutrality Rant May Have Caused FCC
Site Crash, Wash. Post (June 4, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/
wp/2014/06/04/john-olivers-net-neutrality-rant-may-have-caused-fcc-site-crash/ [http://per
ma.cc/4DRX-LV7B].
239. Elise Hu, 3.7 Million Comments Later, Here’s Where Net Neutrality Stands, NPR (Sept.
17, 2014), http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2014/09/17/349243335/3-7-million-
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though Obama campaigned on the issue of net neutrality,240 however,
Obama never filed a comment with the FCC during the comment period.241
Instead, weeks after the comment period closed, Obama elected to use
WhiteHouse.gov as his platform of choice for publicly issuing a written
statement and accompanying video that pressured the FCC to “create a new
set of rules protecting net neutrality.”242 In his written statement, Obama
outlined in some detail the rules that he believed the FCC should adopt
pursuant to Title II of the Communications Act, going so far as to include a
bulleted list of four special requests for the rules: no blocking; no throttling;
increased transparency; and no paid prioritization.243 In urging the FCC to
reclassify consumer broadband service under Title II of the Telecommunica-
tions Act, the President called on the public to share the President’s plan via
Facebook and Twitter buttons prominently featured on WhiteHouse.gov.244
In his public statement, Obama expressly acknowledged that “[t]he FCC
is an independent agency, and ultimately this decision is theirs alone.”245
This is notable: although presidential attempts to influence executive agen-
cies like the EPA have become commonplace, presidential efforts to so di-
rectly influence independent agencies are less common.246 Thus, critics of the
President’s plan quickly asserted that Obama had improperly called into
question the FCC’s reputation as an independent agency. One former FCC
commissioner, for example, asserted that Obama’s actions represented an
“unwelcome assault on the independence of the FCC” and a “threat to our
entire system of government based on the rule of law.”247 Others argued that
comments-later-heres-where-net-neutrality-stands [http://perma.cc/NS7F-V8KU] (noting that
one study of the first 800,000 comments found that “fewer than 1 percent were opposed to net
neutrality enforcement”); Gigi B. Sohn & David A. Bray, Setting the Record Straight on Open
Internet Comments, FCC (Dec. 23, 2014), http://www.fcc.gov/blog/setting-record-straight-
open-internet-comments [https://perma.cc/2CSY-MXFX] (“The total comment count in the
Open Internet docket is nearly 4 million . . . .”).
240. See Alina Selyukh, Obama Pressures FCC for Strong Net Neutrality Rules, Reuters
(Nov. 10, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/10/us-usa-internet-neutrality-idUS
KCN0!U1I620141110 [http://perma.cc/C5GL-LD7A].
241. See Marvin Ammori, More than 3 Million Told the FCC What They Think About Net
Neutrality. Why Hasn’t Obama?, Slate (Sept. 16, 2014, 12:01 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs
/future_tense/2014/09/16/fcc_net_neutrality_comments_period_why_hasn_t_obama_weighed
_in.html [http://perma.cc/T7GN-JQXA]. Notably, various executive agencies have filed com-
ments with the FCC in a variety of proceedings during Obama’s presidency. See Administra-
tion FCC Filings, FCC, https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1wdocj8MAANTx7_dUbJhKo
H40Q7QvkjQ519ysKWPyjPE/edit?pli=1#gid=0 [https://perma.cc/ZD36-Y37Y].
242. Net Neutrality: President Obama’s Plan for a Free and Open Internet, supra note 12.
243. Id.
244. See id. (“Share the news and the special thank-you message from the President with
your network.”).
245. Id.
246. See, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 523 (2009)
(“[I]ndependent agencies are sheltered not from politics but from the President . . . .”).
247. Harold Furchtgott-Roth, President Obama Attacks FCC’s Independence, Forbes (Nov.
11, 2014, 12:23 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/haroldfurchtgottroth/2014/11/11/president-
obama-attacks-fccs-independence/ [http://perma.cc/9HJ6-WMNE].
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the President had “injected politics into what should be a nonpartisan
agency process.”248 Indeed, one commentator noted that Obama had put the
chairman of the FCC in a “very tough” position because, if the FCC had
followed the President’s recommendation, the FCC’s decision would “reek
of politics, and nobody will get [the smell] off of them.”249
A few months later, FCC Chairman Tom Wheeler announced in Wired
that he was proposing strong net neutrality rules that aligned with Obama’s
plan to reclassify consumer broadband service under Title II of the Commu-
nications Act—even though Wheeler had not endorsed reclassification prior
to Obama’s statement.250 Republican-led House and Senate committees
launched investigations into Obama’s influence over the FCC’s proceedings,
reiterating the refrain of inappropriate political influence.251 The letter that
the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform sent to the
FCC, for example, noted concerns that the White House may have had an
“improper influence” on the FCC’s ongoing rulemaking proceeding.252
Ultimately, in the spring of 2015, the FCC adopted and released new
rules that followed the President’s preferred path of reclassification, declar-
ing broadband Internet access service to be a telecommunications service
under Title II of the Communications Act.253 The new rules “prohibit block-
ing, throttling, and paid prioritization”; prevent “broadband providers from
unreasonably interfering or disadvantaging consumers or edge providers
from reaching one another on the Internet”; and provide “for enhanced
transparency into network management practices, network performance,
and commercial terms of broadband Internet access service.”254
Although the final rule closely tracked what President Obama had asked
for, the final rule and the accompanying statement of basis and purpose that
the FCC published in the Federal Register said nothing of the President’s
involvement.255 In addition, the FCC’s Report and Order on Remand,
248. Edward Wyatt, Call for Open Internet Sets up Fight over Rules, N.Y. Times, Nov. 12,
2014, at B8.
249. Id.
250. Tom Wheeler, FCC Chairman Tom Wheeler: This Is How We Will Ensure Net Neutral-
ity, Wired (Feb. 4, 2015, 11:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/2015/02/fcc-chairman-wheeler-
net-neutrality/ [http://perma.cc/825S-FHK4].
251. Jim Puzzanghera, Congress Probing White House Role in FCC Chief’s Net-Neutrality
Plan, L.A. Times (Feb. 9, 2015, 11:50 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-net-neutral-
ity-fcc-chaffetz-probe-20150209-story.html [http://perma.cc/FX4Z-XPEL].
252. Letter from Jason Chaffetz, Chairman, Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, U.S.
House of Representatives, to Tom Wheeler, Chairman, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n 1 (Feb. 6,
2015), http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/2015-02-06-JEC-to-Wheeler-
FCC-open-internet.pdf [http://perma.cc/HNA6-MX45].
253. See Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 80 Fed. Reg. 19,738 (Apr. 13, 2015)
(to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 1, 8, 20).
254. Id.
255. Id.
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Declaratory Ruling, and Order barely even hinted at the President’s involve-
ment.256 However, Commissioner Wheeler’s separate statement accompany-
ing the report briefly acknowledged the President’s involvement, stating:
We heard from startups and world-leading tech companies. We heard from
ISPs, large and small. We heard from public-interest groups and public-
policy think tanks. We heard from Members of Congress, and, yes, the Pres-
ident. Most important, we heard from nearly 4 million Americans who
overwhelmingly spoke up in favor of preserving a free and open
Internet.257
One commissioner, however, called out the President’s involvement much
more forcefully. In a dissenting statement, Commissioner Pai criticized the
FCC’s change of course and the President’s involvement, stating:
So why is the FCC changing course? Why is the FCC turning its back on
Internet freedom? Is it because we now have evidence that the Internet is
not open? No. Is it because we have discovered some problem with our
prior interpretation of the law? No. We are flip-flopping for one reason and
one reason alone. President Obama told us to do so.258
Pai is clearly correct that President Obama played a key causal role in
the FCC’s shift in its approach and ultimate decisions to reclassify broad-
band. Yet what is much less clear is whether there is anything inherently
nefarious about the President’s attempts to steer the FCC’s net neutrality
rules—just as other members of the public tried to steer the FCC’s views.259
Obama’s efforts to influence the FCC’s proceedings were public and trans-
parent. Obama issued his statement and accompanying video via
WhiteHouse.gov, and he openly encouraged members of the public to share
his message using social-media tools.260 Furthermore, Obama’s public state-
ment demonstrated respect for the FCC’s status as an independent agency,
openly acknowledging that the decision ultimately rested in the FCC’s hands
256. See Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, FCC 15-24, GN Docket No. 14-28
at 196 n.1223 (Mar. 12, 2015), https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-15-24A
1.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZV28-2W7Y] (referencing in passing in a footnote “the President’s
push for Title II reclassification”).
257. Id. at 314 (Chairman Wheeler, concurring) (emphasis added).
258. Id. at 321 (Comm’r Pai, dissenting).
259. See Memorandum from Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen. John O. McGinnis to the
Deputy Counsel to President George H. W. Bush (Jan. 14, 1991), http://www.justice.gov/sites/
default/files/olc/opinions/1991/01/31/op-olc-v015-p0001.pdf [http://perma/Q6BF-PBS4] (“We
believe it is clearly permissible, as a matter of general administrative law, for White House
officials . . . to contact FCC Commissioners to advocate a position on this rulemaking.”);
Marvin Ammori, The White House Gave the FCC Advice on Net Neutrality. That’s how It’s
Supposed to Work, Slate (Feb. 11, 2015, 3:55 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/20
15/02/11/republicans_say_white_house_interfered_with_fcc_on_net_neutrality_they_re.html
[http://perma.cc/66QF-SVD9] (“This network neutrality proceeding is an example of how the
government should operate.”).
260. See Net Neutrality: President Obama’s Plan for a Free and Open Internet, supra note 12
(detailing Obama’s own plan for net neutrality and calling on others to share his plan using
social media).
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alone.261 In this sense, Obama’s overt involvement furthers notions of politi-
cal accountability and transparency, helping the public to understand that
the decision rests in the hands of the FCC262 but making clear that the Presi-
dent is doing what he can to respond to broad public sentiment on net
neutrality.263
***
In sum, these three case studies demonstrate how more overt and trans-
parent forms of presidential control can promote positive values like politi-
cal accountability, regulatory efficiency, and coherence. In contrast, other
more submerged forms of presidential control can taint agency science, push
agencies to consider factors that are not relevant under the statutory scheme,
and undermine transparency. Yet the most prevalent response to presidential
control—that of “expertise forcing”—focuses myopically on the negative at-
tributes of presidential control. The next Part of this Article describes and
critiques “expertise forcing,” arguing that it is a misguided reaction to the
entrenchment of presidential control.
III. Expertise Forcing: A Pervasive but Misguided Reaction
The most common response by courts, Congress, scholars, the media,
and others when faced with specific instances of presidential control over the
regulatory state has been a kind of reflexive “expertise forcing.” Rather than
using the term expertise forcing to describe some kind of concerted legal
tool for responding to presidential control, this Article uses the term to refer
to generalized efforts—both inside and outside courts—to try to force regu-
lators to exercise expert judgment based on apolitical, technocratic reasons.
This Part argues that expertise forcing is misguided. It focuses too myopi-
cally on restraining the negative aspects of presidential control, and in doing
so, it fails to consider the beneficial role that political influences might play.
Furthermore, it adheres to outmoded notions of agencies as apolitical ex-
perts, and it threatens to drive political, policy-laden decisions underground
where they are insulated from oversight and scrutiny.
261. Id.
262. On February 26, 2015, the FCC voted 3-2 along party lines to regulate broadband
Internet service as a public utility under Title II of the Communications Act, thus adopting net
neutrality rules aligned with Obama’s own plan. Rebecca R. Ruiz & Steve Lohr, F.C.C. Ap-
proves New Neutrality Rules, Classifying Broadband Internet Service as a Utility, N.Y. Times
(Feb. 26, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/27/technology/net-neutrality-fcc-vote-inter
net-utility.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/2842-Y58E].
263. See Net Neutrality: President Obama’s Plan for a Free and Open Internet, supra note 12
(“I am asking the [FCC] to answer the call of almost 4 million public comments, and imple-
ment the strongest possible rules to protect net neutrality.”).
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A. The Push for Expertise
Jody Freeman and Adrian Vermeule first coined the phrase “expertise
forcing” in the context of analyzing the Supreme Court’s decision in Massa-
chusetts v. EPA.264 In Massachusetts, the Court reviewed the EPA’s denial of a
rulemaking petition that asked the EPA to regulate certain emissions from
new motor vehicles—emissions that lead to global warming.265 Justice Ste-
vens’s opinion for a five-justice majority held that the EPA has the statutory
authority to regulate such emissions and that the various policy-driven rea-
sons the EPA offered for declining to regulate, ranging from a desire to avoid
piecemeal regulation to a desire to avoid interfering with the President’s for-
eign-policy initiatives, were not sufficient reasons for denying the petition.266
Essentially, the Court told the EPA that it needed to make a scientific deter-
mination regarding whether the emissions from new motor vehicles do or
do not endanger the public health or welfare within the meaning of the
Clean Air Act. According to the Court, policy-driven considerations were to
factor into the EPA’s decision to regulate or not to regulate, if at all, only
after the EPA made an expert judgment.267
In light of Massachusetts’s embrace of expert-driven agency decision-
making, Freeman and Vermeule have argued that the case stands as an ex-
ample of an attempt “by courts to ensure that agencies exercise expert
judgment free from outside political pressures, even or especially political
pressures emanating from the White House or political appointees in the
agencies.”268 In Freeman and Vermeule’s view, Massachusetts illustrates the
Supreme Court’s “increasing worries about the politicization of administra-
tive expertise.”269 According to Freeman and Vermeule, the Court is not na-
ı¨ve and does not think that “expert decisions should be completely separated
from politics.”270 Rather, the Court in Massachusetts hinted that the pendu-
lum between politics and expertise had “swung too far . . . in the direction of
strong presidential administration, and that [the Court] wished to nudge it
in the other direction.”271
In reality, however, expertise forcing extends far beyond the confines of
the Supreme Court in cases like Massachusetts and even beyond the confines
of the federal courts as a whole. Indeed, when conceptualized broadly, not as
a distinct legal tool used only by the courts but rather as a generalized reac-
tion to the clash between expertise and political influence in agency deci-
sionmaking, expertise forcing defines how many different actors approach
264. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
265. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 497.
266. Id.
267. Kathryn A. Watts & Amy J. Wildermuth, Massachusetts v. EPA: Breaking New Ground
on Issues Other than Global Warming, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1029, 1043–44 (2008).
268. Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 21, at 52.
269. Id.; see also id. at 93–94.
270. Id. at 108.
271. Id. at 109.
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the issue of presidential control. Members of Congress, scholars, and the
media all frequently turn to expertise forcing as a kind of instinctive, knee-
jerk reaction—particularly when they do not agree with the substantive out-
come of an agency decision.
First, consider Congress. When faced with specific allegations of presi-
dential influence over agency rulemaking proceedings, Congress often holds
oversight hearings or launches congressional investigations to try to force
expert-driven decisions by agencies.272 This is exactly what happened, for
example, in the wake of Obama’s recent efforts to influence the FCC’s ongo-
ing net neutrality rulemaking.273 The Republican chair of the House Com-
mittee on Oversight and Government Reform wrote a letter to the FCC,
demanding that it preserve documents that might shed light on the White
House’s allegedly “improper” influence on the FCC’s proceedings.274 Like-
wise, the Republican chair of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs launched an investigation, noting concerns that
the White House had exerted “undue outside pressure[ ]” on the FCC and
had tried to “supplant the agency’s decision-making apparatus.”275 These
and other congressional hearings and investigations reflect a kind of reflexive
reaction to presidential influence—one that indiscriminately and simplisti-
cally projects the view of politics as “bad” and expertise as “good.” Some-
what ironically, this is done perhaps as a smokescreen for attempts by the
controlling party in Congress to further its own political will.
Second, the media, too, often projects the same sense that agency deci-
sionmaking should be apolitical and expert driven. For example, during the
net neutrality proceedings,276 a New York Times article quoted various oppo-
nents of Obama’s proposal who “said that [Obama’s actions] injected polit-
ics into what should be a nonpartisan agency process.”277 Subsequently, just
after FCC Chairman Wheeler announced that he planned to propose net
neutrality rules aligned with Obama’s own views,278 the Wall Street Journal
published an article casting a shadow over Obama’s involvement. The Wall
Street Journal asserted that Obama’s net neutrality comments had “swept
aside more than a decade of light-touch regulation of the Internet and
months of work by Mr. Wheeler,” and were the product of various “secret[ ]
272. See, e.g., Science Under Siege: Scientific Integrity at the Environmental Protection
Agency, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the Comm. on Energy &
Commerce, 110th Cong. (2008).
273. See supra Section II.C (discussing Obama’s involvement in net neutrality).
274. See Letter from Jason Chaffetz to Tom Wheeler, supra note 252.
275. Letter from Ron Johnson, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Govern-
mental Affairs, to Tom Wheeler, Chairman, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n 2–3 (Feb. 9, 2015),
http://www.ronjohnson.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/269a8d03-1eea-4b00-9af2-54d7408f83
ab/2015-02-09-johnson-to-wheeler-fcc-re-net-neutrality.pdf [http://perma.cc/SD56-WV67].
276. See supra Section II.C (discussing Obama’s efforts to influence the FCC’s net neutral-
ity rulemaking).
277. Wyatt, supra note 248.
278. See supra note 250 and accompanying text (outlining Wheeler’s proposal).
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White House meetings.”279 What the mainstream news media did not ex-
plain in its coverage of Obama’s involvement in net neutrality was precisely
why Obama’s involvement was improper, or why so-called secret meetings
at the White House were necessarily sinister. After all, White House meet-
ings, by definition, are private and closed to the general public. Instead, the
news media’s coverage of Obama’s reaction rested on the same highly sim-
plistic view that politics are “bad” and expertise is “good” when it comes to
agency decisionmaking.
Third, while scholars often justify the legitimacy of the administrative
state by relying on the President’s ability to hold agencies accountable,280
scholars also frequently advocate in favor of expertise forcing in one form or
another, arguing against the politicization of agency action or advancing
arguments that would necessarily narrow the space for presidential judg-
ments. Justice Breyer, who has co-authored a leading administrative law
casebook,281 is among these scholars. Justice Breyer stresses the benefits of
depoliticized decisionmaking by elite, professional experts and argues in
favor of the virtues of rationalization, expertise, and insulation from
politics.282
Other scholarly work echoes this same sense that agency decisionmaking
should be driven by expertise, not political influence. One scholar, for exam-
ple, argues for the abolition of OIRA review, because White House review
has “evolved into a relentless gauntlet for public health, worker safety, and
environmental-protection initiatives, subjecting the agencies’ efforts to im-
plement their demanding statutory mandates to withering rule-by-rule re-
view.”283 Others have argued that White House review by OIRA of agency
rules is something to be “constrain[ed].”284 Still others have argued against
the notion that courts should consider political influences when determin-
ing whether agencies have adequately justified their policy determinations.285
279. Nagesh & Mullins, supra note 11.
280. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political
Decisions, 1 J.L. Econ. & Org. 81, 95–98 (1985) (arguing that accountability concerns tip in
favor of broad delegations to agencies); see also Matthew C. Stephenson, Optimal Political
Control of the Bureaucracy, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 53, 59–60 (2008) (“Scholars with diverse ideo-
logical and methodological commitments have asserted that . . . two premises . . .—that bu-
reaucratic policy should track majoritarian values and that this goal is best advanced by giving
decision-making authority to the most politically accountable officials—imply the need for
presidential control over bureaucratic policymaking . . . .”).
281. See Stephen G. Breyer et al., Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy (6th
ed. 2006).
282. See Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Reg-
ulation 55–56, 59–61 (1993).
283. Rena Steinzor, The Case for Abolishing Centralized White House Regulatory Review, 1
Mich. J. Envtl. & Admin. L. 209, 209 (2012).
284. Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard Murphy, Constraining White House Political Control of
Agency Rulemaking Through the Duty of Reasoned Explanation, 48 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1457,
1457 (2015).
285. See, e.g., Enrique Armijo, Politics, Rulemaking, and Judicial Review: A Response to
Professor Watts, 62 Admin. L. Rev. 573, 574 (2010) (arguing that rulemaking has “to be a facts-
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B. The Inadequacy of Expertise Forcing
On its surface, the emergence of expertise forcing as a reaction to in-
creasing presidential control is understandable. After all, at its core, expertise
forcing responds to the negative and corrupting aspects of presidential con-
trol, including concerns that presidential control can be used to undermine
transparency, to subvert science, and to trample on the rule of law. None-
theless, despite its superficial appeal, expertise forcing is a misguided and
potentially damaging response to the entrenchment of presidential control.
First, it is futile to try to sanitize agency rulemaking of political influ-
ences. As the ozone NAAQS case study discussed earlier demonstrates, even
an administration that openly commits itself to protecting science and ex-
pertise—as Obama did upon entering office—cannot completely eradicate
the uneasy tension between expertise and politics in rulemaking.286 Today,
rulemaking effectively operates as lawmaking by another name, and it regu-
larly touches on difficult policy questions that are at the heart of political
discourse in our country.287 Notably, these important value-based policy
judgments often must be made in the face of statutory and scientific uncer-
tainty. When science and expertise alone cannot answer questions concern-
ing how or when best to regulate, competing value-laden policy preferences
necessarily and inevitably will come into play.288
Second, even if politics could be excised from rulemaking as a practical
matter, it would be undesirable to do so as a normative matter. Agencies
make decisions about key policy matters touching on everything from the
environment to public health in the face of scientific uncertainty and with
only the most skeletal directions from Congress.289 Scholars routinely justify
agencies’ power to make these important policy decisions by emphasizing
that agencies are accountable to Congress and to the President through the
appointment and removal process and through many other political control
mechanisms.290 In other words, we justify the existence and the legitimacy of
what would otherwise be a “headless fourth branch” by the fact that the
driven process”). But see Watts, supra note 19 (arguing in favor of giving politics an accepted
place in arbitrary-and-capricious review).
286. See supra Section II.B (discussing the ozone NAAQS case study).
287. See Kathryn A. Watts, Rulemaking as Legislating, 103 Geo. L.J. 1003, 1014–15 (2015).
288. See Kagan, supra note 1, at 2356–57 (arguing that a strong presidential role is appro-
priate when agencies “confront the question, which science alone cannot answer, of how to
make determinate judgments regarding the protection of health and safety in the face both of
scientific uncertainty and competing public interests”).
289. See Martin Shapiro, Who Guards the Guardians? Judicial Control of Ad-
ministration 171 (1988) (“Agencies . . . mak[e] a good deal of law within broad congres-
sional constraints and in the face of considerable uncertainty about facts and diverse and
changing political sentiments.”).
290. See, e.g., Kathryn A. Watts, Constraining Certiorari Using Administrative Law Princi-
ples, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 23 (2011) (“[A]dministrative law’s primary purpose has been to
develop various legal structures and mechanisms—such as political oversight, judicial review,
public participation, and reason-giving requirements—that help to legitimate and control
agency action.”).
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political branches can and do exert control over agency heads. Justice Ste-
vens recognized as much in 1984 in his now-famous Chevron opinion.291
Although “agencies are not directly accountable to the people,” he said, “the
Chief Executive is,” and it is therefore entirely appropriate for agencies to
rely on “the incumbent administration’s views of wise policy” when making
policy judgments.292 Thus, as Chevron points out, presidential control can
help to further positive values—namely, political accountability and regula-
tory coherence in agency decisionmaking. In its efforts to push politics out
of the rulemaking calculus, expertise forcing fails to take these positive val-
ues into account.
Third, by demanding that agencies justify their decisions in expert-
driven terms, expertise forcing threatens to drive political influences under-
ground where such influences will be protected from public scrutiny, ac-
countability, and oversight.293 Put another way, expertise forcing may well
undermine transparency,294 causing agencies to sweep policy choices under
the rug. One scholar—Martin Shapiro—made a similar argument almost
three decades ago just as presidential control was beginning to emerge, stat-
ing: “By requiring the agencies to present [their] decisions as if they were
rationalist, technical, and synoptic, the courts drive the very prudential deci-
sions that ought to be out front and subject to public . . . scrutiny under a
. . . smoke screen.”295 As a result, “what we get is secret prudence unguarded
by anyone.”296
Finally, expertise forcing may have unintended consequences for agen-
cies’ science. Because political influences lack an accepted place of their own
in an expertise-forcing world, agency decisionmakers may well be tempted
to bend facts or subvert science in order to reach preferred policy out-
comes.297 Or, they might hide policy choices that inform their scientific deci-
sions. As Emily Meazell explains, science—even “good” science—often
291. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
292. Id. at 865; see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(noting that the NHTSA’s changed views seemed “to be related to the election of a new Presi-
dent,” which is “a perfectly reasonable basis for an executive agency’s reappraisal of the costs
and benefits of its programs and regulations”).
293. See Watts, supra note 19, at 40 (“Under the current technocratic model’s focus on
facts and evidence, agencies have an incentive to dress up their decisions in technocratic terms
and to hide political influences.”).
294. See Holly Doremus, Scientific and Political Integrity in Environmental Policy, 86 Tex.
L. Rev. 1601, 1629 (2008) (arguing that agency personnel should be “explicit about places
where the actor believes the governing law leaves room for the agency to make policy choices,
and openly acknowledging the choices made”).
295. Shapiro, supra note 289, at 156.
296. Id.
297. See Watts, supra note 19, at 40 (noting that in a world in which agencies are expected
to act in a technocratic manner, “[a]gencies . . . may well be tempted to align facts and science
with political choices rather than giving science its own rightful place that is separate from
political or value-laden considerations”).
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involves and integrates policy choices.298 Scientists conducting experiments,
for instance, may have to make decisions about what to “include or exclude
in an experiment, what parameters to set for a model, the choice of mea-
surement techniques, or intentional or even unknowing assumptions”—
without there being any one choice that is clearly “right” as a matter of
scientific method.299 According to Meazell, good scientific practices would
simply call for the scientists to document and disclose any policy choices
that they made.300 An expertise-forcing model might undermine these good
scientific practices, incentivizing agencies to sweep policy-laden choices
under the rug.
In sum, although expertise forcing represents an understandable effort
to push back against many of the negative aspects of presidential control,
expertise forcing focuses too narrowly on the “bad” side of political influ-
ences and fails to accommodate the “good” aspects of presidential control,
such as its potential to further political accountability and regulatory coher-
ence. Furthermore, expertise forcing might actually cause affirmative harm
by, for example, pushing policy-laden choices underground where they can-
not be subjected to scrutiny and oversight. Given that presidential control is
here to stay, administrative law must develop a more realistic and effective
response. The next Part takes up that question, arguing that a variety of
nonconstitutional administrative law doctrines can and should be coordi-
nated to enhance the positive and minimize the negative aspects of presiden-
tial control.
IV. Controlling Presidential Control Through a Coordinated
Doctrinal Response
As this Article has demonstrated, presidential control over the regula-
tory state is here to stay. It has become woven into the fabric of the regula-
tory state, and it occurs regardless of the political party in the White
House.301 Furthermore, presidential control is complex and nuanced; it can
further positive values, such as political accountability and regulatory coher-
ence, but it can also raise concerns about agency legitimacy, nontransparent
decisions, and the weakening of science.302 Thus, given its complexity, presi-
dential control is not susceptible to a one-size-fits-all response. Nor can the
298. Emily Hammond Meazell, Super Deference, the Science Obsession, and Judicial Review
as Translation of Agency Science, 109 Mich. L. Rev. 733, 744 (2011) (“[P]olicy informs every-
thing from how an experiment is designed to how results are interpreted and
communicated.”).
299. Id. at 745.
300. Id. at 746 (“It may not be possible to isolate every policy decision that has been
made, but to the extent one can identify specific junctures that involve policy, the norms of the
scientific community demand disclosure.”).
301. See supra Part I (describing the entrenchment of presidential control over the regula-
tory state).
302. See supra Part II (analyzing three different case studies that illustrate how presidential
control involves a complex mix of positive and negative attributes); see also Wendy Wagner,
Science in Regulation: A Study of Agency Decisionmaking Approaches 75–91 (2013),
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complex nature of presidential control be effectively managed by simply
tweaking just one isolated administrative law doctrine or another.303 Rather,
as this Part demonstrates, a more coordinated, interlocking doctrinal re-
sponse is needed.
This Part lays the foundation for such a response, identifying and cate-
gorizing a range of different doctrines that should be coordinated to mini-
mize the negative and enhance the positive attributes of presidential control.
Specifically, this Part sketches out three relevant categories of doctrinal
mechanisms that can be used to develop a powerful framework for control-
ling presidential control: (1) statutorily facing rules; (2) transparency-en-
hancing mechanisms; and (3) process-forcing rules. It then situates a variety
of different administrative law doctrines within each of these three
categories.
A. Statutorily Facing Rules
It is a bedrock principle of administrative law that agencies derive their
power from Congress and that agencies’ exercises of delegated lawmaking
power are subject to any limitations that Congress might choose to im-
pose.304 Yet, despite widespread acceptance of the notion that agencies are
creatures of statutes, there is a lack of clarity concerning both (1) when stat-
utes delegating discretionary powers to agencies allow agencies to act pursu-
ant to presidential directions; and (2) when statutes delegating discretionary
powers to agencies allow agencies to take presidential suggestions into ac-
count.305 Both of these questions—which I refer to as “statutorily facing”
questions—involve looking to the relevant statute and interpreting Con-
gress’s intent, asking whether Congress intended to allow the President to
outright direct, or sometimes to merely influence, an agency decision made
under a particular statutory scheme. The lack of clarity in this area is due to
Congress’s silence on the matter and to the absence of constitutional gui-
dance; rarely do statutes delegating discretionary power to agencies expressly
speak to whether an agency head may consult with the President or may be
forced to take certain action at the President’s direction.306
https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Sci-
ence%20in%20Regulation_Final%20Report_2_18_13_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/U394-6CAV]
(using two case studies to demonstrate the lack of transparency surrounding OIRA’s influence
over regulatory decisions involving science).
303. See supra note 19 (citing scholars who have argued that one discrete set of doctrines
or another can be used to respond to political influence over agency decisions).
304. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302 (1979) (“[T]he exercise of quasi-
legislative authority by governmental departments and agencies must be rooted in a grant of
such power by the Congress and subject to limitations which that body imposes.”).
305. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (“Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency
has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider . . . .”).
306. See Jerry L. Mashaw et al., Administrative Law: The American Public Law
System 292 (5th ed. 2003) (“Virtually all statutes conveying rulemaking power to executive (as
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Notably, these statutorily facing questions—that is, questions that in-
volve determining the statutorily permissible space for presidential direc-
tions and suggestions—must be answered before considering how other
legal doctrines might be used to control presidential control. After all, it
would be futile to try to craft legal doctrines aimed at doing things like
increasing transparency and cutting back on veiled presidential influence if
Congress foreclosed presidential control from operating in the first place.
1. The Statutorily Allowable Space for Presidential Directions
The first statutorily facing issue that needs resolution is how to deter-
mine whether, as a matter of statutory interpretation, Congress intends the
President to be allowed to direct—or to dictate—the outcome of a discre-
tionary action Congress vested in a particular administrative agency. Put
another way, when can the President step into the shoes of the agency and
make a decision that Congress delegated to a specified agency official?
To date, the courts have yet to resolve this question.307 One explanation
may be that some discretionary agency actions directed by the President,
such as the EPA’s 2011 withdrawal of its proposed ozone standards, do not
constitute final agency action and thus may not be judicially reviewable.308
In addition, if a presidential directive is not made public but rather is merely
communicated orally to an agency, would-be challengers might not have any
affirmative directive coming from the President to challenge in court.309
Faced with a dearth of case law on the subject, scholars have actively
debated this question and have proposed dueling interpretive approaches.310
well as ‘independent’) agencies are silent on such questions as whether the agency head may
consult with the President or his agents and, if so, on what basis.”).
307. See Kagan, supra note 1, at 2320 (noting that the “view that the President lacks direc-
tive authority over administrative officials” has never been adjudicated); id. at 2321 (noting the
lack of Supreme Court cases on whether the President himself may step into an agency’s shoes
when Congress delegates discretionary power to an agency official); Percival, supra note 17, at
2487–88 (describing ongoing “debate” about whether the President does or does not have
directive authority).
308. See supra notes 221–228 and accompanying text (discussing how the D.C. Circuit
determined that it lacked jurisdiction to review the EPA’s withdrawal of its ozone standards at
President Obama’s direction).
309. This is exactly what happened recently in the context of Obama’s executive action on
immigration. The President Speaks on Fixing America’s Broken Immigration System, supra note
14 and accompanying text (discussing Obama’s televised address on immigration). When a
lawsuit was filed by more than half of the States challenging the Obama administration’s de-
ferred action program, the suit necessarily challenged the written directive issued by DHS, not
any directive issued by Obama. Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 607  (S.D. Tex.
2015). Indeed, the district court judge in the case noted that there were “no executive orders or
other presidential proclamations or communique” to challenge. Id.
310. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 1, at 2326–27 (arguing that when a statute delegates
power to an executive branch official, that delegation is “still subject to the ultimate control of
the President”); Kevin M. Stack, The President’s Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 106
Colum. L. Rev. 263, 263 (2006) (“[T]he President has statutory authority to direct the admin-
istration of the laws only under statutes that grant to the President in name.”).
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This scholarly debate has created a cloud of legal uncertainty around presi-
dential directives—a cloud that likely has helped to fuel expertise forcing.
At one end of the scholarly debate, Kagan argued almost fifteen years
ago that delegations of discretionary authority running to an executive
agency official (who is subject to “at will” removal by the President) should
be presumed to grant the President ultimate control over the decision.311 In
contrast, when a statute grants discretionary authority to an independent
agency that is insulated from the President’s unfettered removal power, Ka-
gan took the position that Congress should be presumed to have barred the
President from directing the outcome of the discretionary action.312
At the other end, Professor Stack argues for a reverse statutory pre-
sumption. According to Stack, “as a matter of statutory construction, the
President has directive authority—that is, the power to act directly under
the statute or to bind the discretion of lower level officials—only when the
statute expressly grants power to the President in name.”313 To support his
rule of statutory construction, Stack points to examples of what he calls
“mixed agency-President delegations”—meaning statutes that condition
delegations of power to agencies on “the approval of the President” or “the
direction of the President,” or similar words.314 He uses these examples to
argue, by negative implication, that statutes that lack such references to pres-
idential involvement necessarily preclude presidential directive authority.315
Although scholars continue to engage in the Stack-Kagan debate,316 the
practical, on-the-ground winner of this debate is clear: Kagan has won. Pres-
idential directive authority with respect to executive agencies is alive and
well. Consider, for example, Obama’s frequent use of published presidential
directives. In contrast, when it comes to independent agencies, Obama has
taken care to merely make “suggestions” to independent agencies—consis-
tent with Kagan’s interpretive principle that distinguishes between executive
and independent agencies.317
311. See Kagan, supra note 1, at 2327 (“The availability of presidential directive authority
. . . usually will turn on the selection of an interpretive principle—really, a presumption—with
which to approach a statutory delegation to an administrative official.”).
312. Id. (“In establishing [an independent] agency, Congress has acted self-consciously, by
means of limiting the President’s appointment and removal power, to insulate agency
decisionmaking . . . .”).
313. Stack, supra note 310, at 267.
314. Id. at 268, 278–83.
315. Id. at 268 (“[‘Mixed agency-President delegations’] provide strong support for the
conclusion that statutory grants of authority to agency officials alone, absent such conditions,
do not authorize the President to act or to bind the discretion of lower-level officials.”).
316. See, e.g., Percival, supra note 17, at 2494–95 (discussing debate concerning the legal-
ity of presidential directives and noting both the Kagan and Stack views).
317. See, e.g., Net Neutrality: President Obama’s Plan for a Free and Open Internet, supra
note 12 (“I respectfully ask [the FCC] to adopt the policies I have outlined here, to preserve
this technology’s promise for today, and future generations to come.”); Presidential Memoran-
dum, supra note 13, at § 4(d) (“Independent agencies are strongly encouraged to comply with
this memorandum.”).
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Kagan’s interpretive approach makes sense as a policy matter. We justify
agencies’ role in our tripartite system largely by emphasizing that agency
heads—even though not elected by the people—are accountable to Congress
and to the President through the appointment and removal process and
through many other political control mechanisms.318 By affirmatively di-
recting the outcome of agency action, presidential directives help to further
both political accountability in the administrative state and legitimacy sur-
rounding agency action—action that without presidential involvement
might otherwise be seen as coming from a headless and unaccountable
fourth branch.
2. The Statutorily Allowable Space for Presidential Suggestions
The Kagan-Stack debate only gets us so far. In particular, Kagan and
Stack focus on whether the President is legally authorized to direct the out-
come of a discretionary agency action by effectively stepping into the
agency’s shoes.319 The Kagan-Stack debate does not speak to how to handle a
separate but even more critical question: Regardless of whether the President
can direct agencies to reach a particular policy outcome, may agencies rely
on presidential suggestions as relevant decisional factors without violating
Congress’s intent?320 For example, may the FCC consider Obama’s views
concerning net neutrality?321 Or may the Federal Aviation Administration
consider the White House’s views on how best to regulate drones?322 Con-
gress is almost always silent on these matters.323 As of now, we lack a coher-
ent theory on this front. Legal scholars have focused on assessing the legality
of presidential directives, glossing over the issue of mere presidential sugges-
tions.324 Furthermore, the courts have sent conflicting messages on the sub-
ject. Indeed, even outside the context of presidential control, the courts have
318. See supra notes 271–273 and accompanying text (discussing how agencies’ legitimacy
hinges on the notion that they are accountable to the political branches).
319. See Kagan, supra note 1, at 2329 (“I suggest . . . that most statutes granting discretion
to executive branch—but not independent—agency officials should be read as leaving ultimate
decisionmaking authority in the hands of the President.”); Stack, supra note 310, at 267 (fo-
cusing on presidential directive authority—meaning the President’s “power to act directly
under the statute or to bind the discretion of lower level officials”).
320. See generally Strauss, supra note 17, at 696–705 (noting that the difference between
“oversight” and “performance”—or between “overseeing” and “deciding”—often goes unno-
ticed in administrative law discussions).
321. See supra Section II.C (discussing Obama’s efforts to influence the FCC’s net neutral-
ity proceeding).
322. See supra note 13 (discussing the White House’s involvement in setting policies for
drone regulation).
323. See Mashaw, supra note 306, at 292 (noting congressional silence in this arena).
324. Kagan likely focuses on the legality of presidential direction—and glosses over the
distinct issue of mere presidential suggestion—because resolving directive authority in the
President’s favor would necessarily mean that anything short of an outright directive must also
be permissible. While this may be true with respect to executive agencies (which, under Ka-
gan’s theory, can be directed by the President), it is not true with respect to independent
agencies. Furthermore, if Stack’s contrary interpretive approach to presidential directions were
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not been clear about what factors an agency “must, can, and cannot consider
in making a decision,” such as when or whether agencies may take costs into
account when setting regulatory policy.325
At one end of the spectrum, Massachusetts v. EPA provides an example
of a case in which the Supreme Court was unwilling to allow presidential
influence to sway the EPA’s decision even though the statute was silent on
the matter.326 At the other end of the spectrum, foundational administrative
law cases like Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.327
and Sierra Club v. Costle328 openly embrace the notion that presidential
power can and should play a role when agencies set policy via rulemaking.
For example, in Sierra Club, the D.C. Circuit noted that rulemaking was not
intended to be a “rarified technocratic process, unaffected by political con-
siderations or the presence of Presidential power.”329
In the end, this lack of doctrinal clarity should not be resolved through
reflexive application of expertise forcing as occurred in Massachusetts v.
EPA.330 Nor should it be resolved through a lackadaisical, anything-goes ap-
proach that would allow any and all influences emanating from the White
House to be considered, regardless of whether those influences relate to the
statutory scheme. Rather, the solution must lie in a more nuanced, statuto-
rily facing rule—one that asks whether the presidential influences are con-
nected to the overall statutory scheme. If Congress is silent about whether an
agency may consider suggestions coming from the White House,331 then
Congress should be presumed to have intended to allow the agency to con-
sider any factors that are rationally and logically related to the statutory
inquiry—regardless of whether they emanate from the White House. Put
another way, the distinguishing factor between permissible and impermissi-
ble considerations should not be the source of the influences, but rather the
substance of the influences and the process used to exert the influences. So
long as the substance of suggestions emanating from the White House relate
to policy choices and public values falling within the general rubric of the
to gain traction, it would still be critical to clarify when agencies may consider presidential
suggestions. Indeed, if Stack’s interpretive approach were to prevail, Presidents would likely
turn with increasing frequency to softer mechanisms for exerting influence, making it even
more critical to clarify the allowable space in which presidential suggestions can operate.
325. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Factors Can an Agency Consider in Making a Decision?,
2009 Mich. St. L. Rev. 67, 67 (noting tension in the case law concerning what decisional
factors an agency is allowed to consider).
326. See Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg.
52,922 (Sept. 8, 2003).
327. 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).
328. 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
329. See Sierra Club, 657 F.2d at 298.
330. 549 U.S. 497, 532–33 (2007); see also Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 21 (describing
Massachusetts as an example of “expertise-forcing”).
331. See Mashaw, supra note 306, at 292 (noting statutory silence in this area).
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relevant statutory regime and so long as procedural requirements are not
violated, then there should be no bar to an agency considering them.332
Three examples illustrate how the statutorily facing rule that I propose
here would operate in practice. First, reconsider the FDA’s handling of the
citizen petition that sought over-the-counter status for Plan B.333 With re-
spect to the petition seeking over-the-counter status for Plan B, the crux of
the statutory inquiry facing the FDA was whether Plan B could be deemed
“safe and effective” for self-administration.334 Given the defined nature of
this statutory inquiry, there was no room for the FDA to deny the citizen
petition due to concerns that granting Plan B over-the-counter status could
be politically damaging to the President during an election year.335 Nor was
there room for generalized judgments about the morality of teen sex or the
ethics of birth control. Instead, the relevant statutory inquiry focused on
protecting “public health” by making sure the drug was “safe and effective”
for self-administration.336 Thus, the statutorily facing rule proposed here
would confirm Judge Korman’s determination that the FDA acted arbitrarily
and capriciously in allowing political influences to trump its scientific
determinations.337
Second, reconsider Obama’s decision to direct the EPA to withdraw its
proposed ozone standards.338 The Clean Air Act did not legally obligate the
EPA to promulgate new standards at that specific point in time; the next
mandatory revision of the ozone standard was not required by the statute to
occur until 2013.339 Indeed, as Obama expressly noted in directing the EPA
to pull the proposed 2011 standards, work was already underway to update
the science that would result in the mandatory reconsideration of the stan-
dards in 2013.340 Revising the standards in 2011, as Obama noted, would
332. See D.C. Fed’n of Civic Ass’ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (holding that
an agency decision should be overturned due to political pressure only if the pressure caused
the agency to decide the matter on factors that were not made relevant by Congress); Watts,
supra note 19, at 52, 54 (arguing that we can presume that “Congress would view political
considerations tied to policy choices or public values falling within the general rubric of the
statutory scheme as logically relevant considerations”).
333. See supra Section II.A (discussing the FDA’s handling of Plan B).
334. Tummino v. Torti, 603 F. Supp. 2d 519, 525 (E.D.N.Y. 2009); see also supra Section
II.A.
335. Cf. Harris, supra note 185 and accompanying text (noting a New York Times article
that suggested that Sebelius’s decision on Plan B “avoided what could have been a bruising
political battle over parental control and contraception during a presidential election season”).
336. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
337. See supra Section II.A (describing Judge Korman’s rulings in the Plan B context).
338. See supra Section II.B (describing Obama’s decision to direct the EPA to pull its
proposed ozone standards).
339. Letter from Cass R. Sunstein to Lisa Jackson, supra note 215.
340. Id.; Statement by the President on the Ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standards,
supra note 221.
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burden “state and local governments” by asking them “to begin implement-
ing a new standard that w[ould] soon be reconsidered.”341 Given that the
statute did not mandate a revision of the ozone standards in 2011, it was
perfectly consistent with the statutory regime for Obama—taking national
priorities and regulatory efficiency into account—to determine that the EPA
should hold off on voluntarily revising the standards at that particular point
in time.342 Thus, according to the statutorily facing rule proposed here, it
was perfectly appropriate for the EPA to consider the President’s views about
matters like regulatory uncertainty and regulatory burdens when withdraw-
ing the voluntary revision of the ozone standards.343
Third, reconsider Obama’s efforts to influence the FCC’s net neutrality
proceeding.344 In launching its rulemaking proceeding, the FCC noted that it
proposed “to rely on Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996” as
its regulatory hook for ensuring that the Internet remains open, but it also
stated that it would “seriously consider the use of Title II of the Communi-
cations Act as the basis for legal authority.”345 It invited “comment on the
benefits of both Section 706 and Title II, including the benefits of one ap-
proach over the other,” and it sought comments on “the best ways to define,
prevent and punish the practices that threaten an open Internet.”346 Thus,
when Obama weighed in on the subject in November 2014 and recom-
mended that the FCC use Title II to promulgate strong rules protecting the
Internet,347 Obama did not push the FCC to consider any factors that were
irrelevant under the relevant statutory schemes. Indeed, Obama spoke di-
rectly to questions on which the FCC had invited public comment, such as
whether a “no blocking” rule should be adopted.348
The mere fact that Obama’s views came from the President—rather
than from some ordinary member of the public or from an industry
group—should not take his views out of the range of permissible and rele-
vant considerations. Put another way, the President, just like any other
member of the public, should be free to post his views on blogs or to create
341. Statement by the President on the Ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standards,
supra note 221.
342. Letter from Cass R. Sunstein to Lisa Jackson, supra note 215.
343. Cf. Matthew R. Bowles, Comment, Speak Now or Forever Be Overruled: Deferring to
Political “Judgment” in EPA Rulemakings, 20 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 591, 629–30 (2013) (“Under
the [Clean Air Act], science remains the foundation of EPA rulemakings, but the Administra-
tor’s authority also includes discretion to consider presidential influence.”).
344. See supra Section II.C (describing Obama’s efforts to influence the net neutrality
debate).
345. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 79 Fed. Reg. 37,448, 37,448 (July 1,
2014) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 8).
346. Id. at 37,448–49.
347. See Net Neutrality: President Obama’s Plan for a Free and Open Internet, supra note
12.
348. See id. (describing Obama’s plan for protecting the Internet, which includes a “no
blocking” rule).
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YouTube videos setting forth his views about agency action. Although Con-
gress did give the FCC a certain level of independence when it insulated the
commissioners from at-will removal by the President, Congress did not pro-
hibit the FCC from considering the President’s views on matters directly
relevant to the FCC’s rulemaking proceeding simply because those views
come from the President rather than from an average member of the pub-
lic.349 Thus, according to the statutorily facing rule proposed here, the FCC
may permissibly consider the President’s views and suggestions on how to
best regulate net neutrality.
As these three examples illustrate, allowing agencies to consider sugges-
tions coming from the President would not mean that agencies could con-
sider any and all presidential influences. Rather, as a matter of statutory
interpretation, the key question would be whether the substance of the pres-
idential suggestion was tethered to or divorced from the relevant statutory
inquiry. The end result would mean that crass political horse trading and
raw political partisanship divorced from the relevant statutory scheme
would fall outside of the realm of permissible considerations; however, a
wide range of other more policy-driven presidential suggestions tied to the
public values or policy choices of the statutory scheme would be permissible
decisional factors. Adoption of this statutorily facing rule would go a long
way toward clarifying that agencies may consider many influences emanating
from the White House, clearing up the cloud that currently hangs over the
permissibility of presidential control. This, in turn, might help to bring
more presidential influences out of the shadows and into the open where
they could be overseen and scrutinized by the public. The next Section turns
to other mechanisms that could be used to bring presidential control into
the open.
B. Transparency-Enhancing Mechanisms
Another doctrinal category that should play a significant role in control-
ling presidential control involves transparency-enhancing mechanisms. As
this Article has demonstrated, when exerted through overt mechanisms like
published presidential directives and public speeches, presidential control
can help to promote political accountability and bolster the perceived legiti-
macy of policy decisions made by unelected agency officials. In contrast,
when presidential control is exerted through more covert means, such as
OMB review and behind-closed-door maneuvering, presidential control can
undermine the transparency of an agency’s decisionmaking process and
349. See 1 Richard J. Pierce Jr., Administrative Law Treatise § 7.9, at 666 (5th ed.
2010) (stating that the President can exert control over policymaking by independent agencies
through informal means, such as by simply calling or having a subordinate call “the critical
decisionmakers at the agency to express the President’s views”); Neal Devins & David E. Lewis,
Not-So Independent Agencies: Party Polarization and the Limits of Institutional Design, 88 B.U.
L. Rev. 459, 498 (2008) (“[T]here is good reason to think that independent agencies will
adhere to presidential preferences once a majority of commissioners are from the President’s
party.” (emphasis omitted)).
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shield the President’s involvement from scrutiny. This lack of transparency,
in turn, can lead to questions about whether presidential involvement
pushed an agency to ignore its own scientific findings or to consider factors
that are not relevant under the applicable statutory regime.
In managing the negative and the positive attributes of presidential con-
trol, there is a need for legal mechanisms designed to compel agencies to be
more transparent about presidential involvement, as well as mechanisms de-
signed to incentivize agencies to openly acknowledge presidential influences.
When coupled together, these different kinds of transparency-enhancing
mechanisms would create a formidable “carrot” and “stick” approach.
1. Forcing Transparency via Disclosure Rules
One approach to achieving greater transparency would be to compel
agencies to disclose the nature and content of White House attempts to in-
fluence rulemaking proceedings. This idea has ample support.350 Professor
Mendelson, for example, argues in favor of procedural rules that would re-
quire a “significant agency rule to include at least a summary of the sub-
stance of executive supervision.”351 According to Mendelson, Congress—or
the President or agencies themselves—could impose a disclosure require-
ment.352 Similarly, Professor Gilhooley recommended more than twenty
years ago that “an agency disclose, as part of the rulemaking record, when
an agency has adopted an administration policy in the oversight process and
the agency’s reasons for doing so.”353 These kinds of transparency-focused
proposals set forth very promising means of controlling presidential control.
Requiring agencies to disclose the substance of significant executive supervi-
sion would enable greater oversight and monitoring of presidential involve-
ment, thereby enhancing the positive political accountability values
associated with presidential control while minimizing the opaque and some-
times corrupting nature of presidential control.354
Nonetheless, in crafting disclosure-forcing rules, care would need to be
taken to respect the President’s very real need to receive honest and frank
advice from his subordinates; subordinates’ willingness to speak freely and
350. See, e.g., Jaclyn L. Falk, Comment, The Behind Closed Door Policy: Executive Influence
in the Environmental Protection Agency’s Informal Rulemaking, 47 U.S.F. L. Rev. 593 (2013); see
also Heinzerling, supra note 122, at 43 (“[I]f the OMB decides not to allow a rule to issue, it
should return the rule to the relevant agency with a written (and public) explanation as to why
it is doing so.”).
351. Mendelson, supra note 19, at 1130.
352. Id. at 1164–65 (noting that the preferred route would be for Congress to legislate a
disclosure requirement).
353. Gilhooley, supra note 19, at 301.
354. Cf. Mendelson, supra note 19, at 1130 (“Requiring greater transparency in the agency
decision-making process may not only increase accountability for agency action, but also help
to deter inappropriate presidential influence and prompt Congress to refine statutory require-
ments if appropriate.”).
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to offer the President trustworthy advice might well be chilled if the subordi-
nates had to offer their advice in the public eye.355
Furthermore, disclosure-forcing rules could not possibly operate in any
meaningful way in isolation.356 This is because increased disclosure of presi-
dential supervision would necessarily lead to a variety of unresolved ques-
tions that touch on other aspects of administrative law. Among these
questions would be: When may agencies consider presidential suggestions or
comply with presidential directions without running afoul of their statutory
mandates? May an agency’s basis of “statement and purpose” accompanying
a final rule be deemed adequate if it only discloses presidential influence in a
boilerplate or highly perfunctory fashion, or if it doesn’t mention the Presi-
dent’s influence at all?357 How should courts treat presidential influences
when reviewing agency action? What kinds of discovery tools should courts
make available to litigants when it appears that an agency affirmatively tried
to hide the substance of presidential supervision?358 What weight should
presidential suggestions be given? As these questions illustrate, the effective-
ness of disclosure rules ultimately would turn on broader administrative law
questions.
In particular, the practical impact of any disclosure rules—whether en-
acted by Congress,359 by the President or by agencies themselves—would
355. Cf. Kathryn A. Watts, Judges and Their Papers, 88 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1665, 1728 (2013)
(noting concerns that have arisen over time about whether the Presidential Records Act has
created a chilling effect, prompting Presidents to refrain from creating written and electronic
records that might be subject to disclosure under the Act).
356. Mendelson acknowledges this. See Mendelson, supra note 19 at 1166 (“[A] disclosure
requirement would likely mean that the judiciary would be presented with a stream of admin-
istrative review cases posing questions regarding the treatment of political reasons.”).
357. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012) (requiring that a final rule incorporate “a concise gen-
eral statement of [the rules’] basis and purpose”).
358. Discovery beyond the administrative record potentially could be used to smoke out
undisclosed political influences, but discovery is currently quite difficult to obtain. See
Heinzerling, supra note 160, at 976–77 (explaining that while discovery beyond the adminis-
trative record is available in theory, it is difficult to obtain in practice). But see Tummino v.
Von Eschenbach, 427 F. Supp. 2d 212, 231–34 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (allowing discovery with re-
spect to the FDA’s refusal to switch Plan B to over-the-counter status because the plaintiffs
made a strong showing that the FDA acted in bad faith). If more hidden presidential influ-
ences are to be brought into the open, then perhaps, as Heinzerling suggests, the “strong
presumption against probing decision makers’ minds should be softened.” Heinzerling, supra
note 160, at 981.
359. If Congress took action, it would have to take care to avoid tripping over executive
privilege issues. See generally Pierce, supra note 349, at 667 (“[Congress] has considered pas-
sage of a statute that would require public disclosure of all communications between OMB and
the agencies it ‘regulates.’ [But] Congress’ ability to require such disclosure may be limited to
some uncertain extent by the doctrine of Executive Privilege.”). Congress also would need to
avoid violating the Opinions Clause, which empowers the President to demand information
from and consult with agency officials. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“The President . . .
may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Depart-
ments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices . . . .”).
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turn heavily on how courts ultimately treated presidential influences in re-
viewing agencies’ rules. If, for example courts responded to a disclosure re-
quirement by reflexively engaging in the kind of expertise forcing seen in
Massachusetts v. EPA,360 then the disclosure requirement would do little to
enhance the positive political accountability values that can be associated
with presidential control. Indeed, judicial hostility to presidential influences
disclosed by agencies would create perverse incentives for agencies to push
presidential influence further underground where they would be free from
public and congressional oversight. Thus, in order to effectively enhance the
positive and restrain the negative aspects of presidential control, any disclo-
sure rules would necessarily require a corresponding shift in judicial treat-
ment of presidential influences—one that would incentivize agencies to
disclose significant presidential influences. The next Subsection turns to
consider how judicial review doctrines might be moved in this direction.
2. Rewarding Transparency via Judicial Review
Two different judicial review doctrines could help incentivize agencies to
disclose significant presidential influences. The first is arbitrary-and-capri-
cious review, which enables courts to ensure that agencies justify their deci-
sions with adequate reasons.361 The second is Chevron deference, which
involves courts deferring to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of statu-
tory ambiguity.362
With respect to arbitrary-and-capricious review, I have explained else-
where that courts currently apply arbitrary-and-capricious review through
an expert-driven lens, demanding that agencies explain their decisions “in
technocratic, statutory, or scientifically driven terms, not political terms.”363
Furthermore, I have argued that expanding arbitrary-and-capricious re-
view’s narrow, technocratic definition of what counts as a valid explanation
to also include political influences tied to the relevant statutory scheme
would incentivize agencies to disclose political influences that they relied
on.364 Simply reconceptualizing arbitrary and capricious review in isolation,
however, would not do much to bring many of the hidden and sometimes
corrupting aspects of presidential control out of the shadows.365 If anything
is to be learned from the lessons of the Bush and Obama administrations’
360. See Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 21, at 93–94 (arguing that the Court’s decision
in Massachusetts represents an example of expertise forcing by the judiciary); supra Section
III.A (describing how Massachusetts represents a case of expertise forcing).
361. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
362. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).
363. Watts, supra note 19, at 5.
364. Id. at 8 (“The heart of the argument set forth here is that what count as ‘valid’
reasons under arbitrary and capricious review should be expanded to include certain political
influences . . . so long as the political influences are openly and transparently disclosed . . . .”).
365. See id. at 5–8 (focusing on arbitrary-and-capricious review and arguing that courts
should treat political influences, including influences coming from the President, as an addi-
tional possible reason for deferring to agencies); id. at 76 (noting that the proposed “carrot”—
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efforts to control the regulatory state, it is that presidential control is ex-
tremely complex and nuanced.366 Thus, reconceptualization of arbitrary-
and-capricious review should be coupled with an affirmative disclosure re-
quirement and with a statutorily facing interpretive rule.367
Chevron deference, which courts grant to agencies’ reasonable interpre-
tations of ambiguities in the statutes that they administer,368 is another key
judicial review doctrine that should be used to incentivize agencies to dis-
close presidential influences. Chevron itself recognized that agencies may
permissibly change their views concerning the meaning of statutory ambigu-
ity, even if those changed views are due to a change in administration.369 But
Chevron does nothing to incentivize agencies to disclose the impact of presi-
dential influences on their legal conclusions. As of now, presidential influ-
ence is irrelevant to the “reasonableness” inquiry at Chevron Step Two.370
This shortcoming could be redressed if Chevron Step Two were concep-
tualized in tandem with arbitrary-and-capricious review in a way that incen-
tivized agencies to reference presidential influences in explaining why they
picked one reasonable interpretation of statutory ambiguity over another or
why their chosen interpretation is reasonable.371 This, for example, might
help the FCC to justify under a Step Two analysis why it is reasonable to
conclude that the Internet should now be regulated using Title II of the
Communications Act.372 Under this reading of Chevron, the FCC would still
need to explain why its reading of the statute represents a reasonable fit with
the statute, but in doing so, the FCC could point to how the President’s
that is, granting deference when agencies openly and transparently rely on political influ-
ences—might need to be balanced by a “stick,” such as a statutory mechanism that forces
disclosure of political influences).
366. See supra Part II (using three case studies from the Bush and Obama administrations
to illustrate the complex nature of presidential control).
367. See supra Section IV.A (discussing statutorily facing rules); supra Section IV.B.1 (dis-
cussing disclosure rules).
368. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984).
369. See id. at 863–64 (“An initial agency interpretation is not instantly carved in stone.”);
id. at 857 (noting that the EPA adopted a new interpretation in 1981 after the Reagan adminis-
tration “took office and initiated a ‘Government-wide reexamination of regulatory burdens
and complexities.’ ” (quoting 46 Fed. Reg. 16,281 (1981))).
370. See id. at 843 (framing the Step Two inquiry in terms of statutory fit and looking at
“whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute”).
371. There is growing support—outside of the context of presidential control—for the
notion that Step Two of Chevron merges with arbitrary-and-capricious review. See, e.g., Judu-
lang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 483 n.7 (2011) (“[U]nder Chevron step two, we ask whether an
agency interpretation is ‘arbitrary or capricious in substance.’ ”); Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory
Util. Comm’rs v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 41 F.3d 721, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Ronald M.
Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1253, 1254
(1997).
372. Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005)
(holding the Communications Act to be ambiguous on the question of whether broadband
internet service providers “offer” “telecommunications service” and thus deferring to the
FCC’s “reasonable” views on the matter).
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views helped to persuade it to resolve statutory ambiguity in the Communi-
cations Act as it did.
In her 2001 article, Kagan suggests that Chevron deference should be
directly linked to—indeed, limited to—agency interpretations influenced by
“presidential involvement.”373 Under this version of Chevron, Kagan argues
that courts should award greater deference to executive than independent
agencies since the President cannot direct independent agencies.374 Further-
more, she argues that Chevron should apply only when “presidential involve-
ment rises to the level of substantiality, as manifested in executive orders and
directives, rulemaking records, and other objective indicia of decisionmak-
ing processes.”375
Unlike Kagan, I do not believe that Chevron deference should be limited
to instances in which presidential involvement impacts an agency’s interpre-
tation of statutory ambiguity. This would represent a dramatic curtailment
of Chevron deference since many run-of-the-mill agency rules (particularly
rules that fall below the “significance” threshold used to trigger OMB re-
view) never involve much, if any, presidential or White House involve-
ment.376 Agencies promulgating these kinds of run-of-the-mill rules should
not lose the benefit of Chevron deference simply because the President was
not involved in the rulemaking proceeding. Instead, presidential involve-
ment—when it exists—should be an additional factor (not the sole factor)
that agencies can point to in demonstrating the reasonableness of their in-
terpretations of statutory ambiguity.
Nor would I limit Chevron deference to executive agencies, as Kagan
suggests. Rather, to induce transparent disclosure of presidential involve-
ment from both executive and independent agencies, Step Two’s reasonable-
ness inquiry should consider any presidential involvement that is
transparently and openly disclosed in the agency’s rulemaking record—re-
gardless of whether the agency is an independent or an executive agency.377
Despite their protection from removal by the President, independent agen-
cies, such as the FCC, should be able to rely on the current administration’s
views of wise policy in picking one statutory interpretation over another and
in helping to justify to a court why a given interpretation is reasonable at
Step Two of Chevron, just as it does the views of other actors.
373. Kagan, supra note 1, at 2376.
374. Id. at 2376–77.
375. Id. at 2377.
376. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 641 (1994) (defining “significant regulatory
action” as including action having “an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or
more”).
377. Cf. Comm’n on Law & the Econ., Am. Bar Ass’n, Federal Regulation: Roads to
Reform 83 (1979) (both independent and executive agencies “issue regulations reflecting basic
economic and social policy decisions for which elected officials should be held responsible and
accountable”).
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These doctrinal changes, if used in concert with one another, would
help to both compel and to incentivize agencies to disclose presidential influ-
ences, thus bringing more instances of presidential control into the open
and furthering political accountability and oversight.
C. Process-Forcing Rules
Finally, in considering how best to enhance the positive and restrain the
negative aspects of presidential control, a variety of “process-forcing” rules
also warrant consideration. The term process-forcing rules is used here to
describe rules that operate to protect the integrity of the notice-and-com-
ment process set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).378 Under
the judiciary’s reading of section 553 of the APA, agencies must include suf-
ficient information in their notices of proposed rulemaking to inform inter-
ested parties of the relevant issues and to ensure “meaningful” public
participation.379 Similarly, when issuing a final rule, the courts have required
agencies’ statements of basis and purpose to respond to any “significant”
comments received.380 This statement of basis and purpose then serves as the
“primary document that judges turn to in deciding the validity of challenged
rules.”381
The APA does not forbid off-the-record communications between agen-
cies and the President, his staff, or other members of the executive branch in
informal notice-and-comment rulemaking proceedings.382 Nonetheless,
when the President injects himself into an agency’s rulemaking proceeding,
concerns may arise that the President’s involvement undermines the notice-
and-comment process and erodes opportunities for public participation.
These concerns could arise in at least three different scenarios.
Undisclosed presidential involvement: First, when the President exerts
control through nontransparent aspects of the OMB review process or
through undocketed, private communications between the White House and
agencies, the public may never learn of the President’s views, let alone be
given an opportunity to comment on or scrutinize them. This undermines
the integrity of the notice-and-comment process by allowing the President
378. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012) (setting forth notice-and-comment process for informal
rulemaking).
379. Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458, 470–71 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
380. Safari Aviation Inc. v. Garvey, 300 F.3d 1144, 1151 (9th Cir. 2002) (“ ‘[S]ignificant
comments’ [are] those which ‘raise relevant points, and which, if adopted, would require a
change in the agency’s proposed rule’ ” (quoting Am. Mining Congress v. EPA, 965 F.2d 759,
771 (9th Cir. 1992))); Rodway v. USDA, 514 F.2d 809, 816–17 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
381. Jeffrey S. Lubbers, A Guide to Federal Agency Rulemaking 257, 337 (5th ed.
2012) (“The notice-and-comment procedures of the APA are intended to encourage public
participation in the administrative process, to help educate the agency, and, thus, to produce
more informed agency decisionmaking.”).
382. See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 404–08 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (allowing undock-
eted, postcomment communication between the President and EPA on policy issues).
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to inject factors into the rulemaking process that the public never has an
opportunity to judge.383
Transparent and public presidential involvement that remains unacknowl-
edged in the agency’s rulemaking record: Second, even when the President
does make his views about a pending rulemaking proceeding very clear to
the public, he might do so outside of the confines of the notice-and-com-
ment process, such as via a public speech or a memorandum that never
appears in the agency’s rulemaking record. This is exactly what happened
recently in the FCC’s net neutrality rulemaking when Obama issued his
written statement and video via WhiteHouse.gov outside of the window that
the FCC had set for public comments.384 The public was made fully aware of
the President’s views, enabling the public to judge the President’s involve-
ment. Yet the format and the timing of the President’s involvement effec-
tively created two very different proceedings: First there was the FCC’s
conventional notice-and-comment proceeding replete with its formalized
procedures and deadlines regarding the submission of comments and ex
parte contacts. Next emerged a different, more real-world proceeding—one
that is replete with the President’s written statement, his online video, and
ongoing public dialogue on the subject that spilled onto the pages of Wired
and other major publications.385
On February 26, 2015, the FCC voted 3-2 along party lines to regulate
broadband Internet service as a public utility under Title II of the Commu-
nications Act, thus voting for net neutrality rules aligned with Obama’s own
plan.386 Yet the FCC’s explanation supporting its order barely gives a nod to
the President’s involvement,387 leaving the notice-and-comment proceeding
and the political proceeding disconnected from one another and making the
notice-and-comment process look like no more than a smokescreen. Unfor-
tunately, this is all too common today in agency rulemaking proceedings.
Likely due to the judiciary’s tendency to view political influence as a “cor-
rupting” influence, agencies rarely acknowledge presidential influences when
issuing final rules—even when the President has played an open and public
role in steering the rulemaking proceeding, as he did in the FCC’s net neu-
trality rules.388
383. Thomas O. McGarity, Presidential Control of Regulatory Agency Decision Making, 36
Am. U.L. Rev. 443, 456–57 (1987) (arguing that because agencies do not disclose ex parte
influences from the President, “[t]he public cannot judge the President’s reasons or motiva-
tions in deciding how to vote in the next election because the public is never even aware of the
intervention, much less of its content”).
384. See supra Section II.C (discussing Obama’s written statement and video).
385. See, e.g., Wheeler, supra note 250 and accompanying text (discussing how the FCC’s
chair used Wired magazine to release an outline of a proposed rule that he was presenting to
the FCC).
386. See Ruiz & Lohr, supra note 262.
387. See supra notes 253–257 and accompanying text.
388. See Watts, supra note 19, at 23–29 (“Given that courts generally apply arbitrary and
capricious review in a way that calls on agencies to justify their decisions in technocratic terms,
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Presidential control over enforcement priorities that are set outside of the
notice and comment process: Third, Presidents might push agencies to use
their broad enforcement powers as a backdoor mechanism for setting sub-
stantive policies, raising concerns about the evasion of notice-and-comment
procedures.389 In other words, the President might encourage agencies to
effectively create “legislative” rules—which generally must go through the
notice-and-comment process—under the guise of merely setting forth
“statements of policy.”390 Policy statements merely “advise the public pro-
spectively of the manner in which the agency proposes to exercise a discre-
tionary power,”391 and—because they do not carry the force and effect of
law—they are exempt from notice and comment.392
Obama’s efforts to defer prosecutorial action in the immigration arena
provide an excellent example of this kind of scenario. DHS implemented
Obama’s plan for fixing our immigration system via a written memoran-
dum, which set forth criteria to guide DHS’s discretion in deciding whether
to defer prosecutorial action with respect to certain undocumented child-
hood and parental arrivals.393 Soon after DHS issued its memo, Obama
stated in a speech in Chicago that he had taken action “to change the law.”394
Texas and twenty-five other states then challenged the legality of DHS’s
memo, claiming, among other things, that the memo was not merely a pol-
icy statement but rather was a legislative rule that needed to go through
notice and comment.395 In February 2015, a federal district court judge is-
sued a preliminary injunction, ruling that the states were likely to succeed
on their procedural claim alleging that DHS had written a legislative rule
under the guise of exercising its enforcement discretion and thus had failed
to comply with the APA’s notice-and-comment requirements.396 In May
it should come as no surprise that agencies today generally couch their decisions in techno-
cratic, statutory, or scientific language, either failing to disclose or affirmatively hiding political
influences . . . .”).
389. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Three-Branch Monte, 72 Notre Dame L. Rev. 157, 157
(1996) (arguing that because agency non-enforcement decisions have been presumptively ex-
empted from judicial review, administrative agencies “shield policy decisions of great public
significance from judicial review by creating a situation in which agencies are able to hide what
are at bottom legislative and judicial judgments behind the facade of executive discretion”).
390. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2012) (exempting “interpretative rules” and “general state-
ments of policy” from notice and comment).
391. Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1109 (D.C. Cir.
1993).
392. See id. at 1108–09.
393. See supra note 309 and accompanying text (noting DHS’s directive).
394. See Opinionated Patriot, Obama Admits He Changed Immigration Law. . . ., YouTube
(Nov. 26, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YAJZupYbT0c [https://perma.cc/DGAV-
SVM8] (providing a video of Obama’s speech in Chicago where Obama stated that he took
action to “change the law” in the immigration arena).
395. Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 607 (S.D. Tex. 2015).
396. Id. at 663 (“The DHS Secretary is not just rewriting the laws; he is creating them
from scratch.”).
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2015, the Fifth Circuit denied a motion to stay the preliminary injunction,397
and as of this writing, the case is still pending.
As each of these three scenarios suggest, the extent to which presidential
control might undermine the APA’s rulemaking process cannot be resolved
using a one-size-fits-all solution. Instead, different process-forcing responses
to each of the three scenarios described above are warranted. The first scena-
rio discussed above—the problem of covert, undisclosed presidential influ-
ence—would best be addressed by drawing on both judicial review doctrines
and disclosure rules to both force and incentivize more disclosure of presi-
dential influences.398 In particular, a new statutory requirement calling for
more disclosure around White House involvement would help. This rule
should merge transparency-enhancing principles with process-forcing prin-
ciples by requiring that presidential involvement in the initial formulation of
a proposed rule be disclosed in the agency’s notice of proposed rulemaking
and that any presidential influence over the content of final rules be dis-
closed in the statement of basis and purpose accompanying the final rule.
Alternatively, in the absence of a new statutory requirement along these
lines, courts could become more willing to allow discovery as a trans-
parency-forcing tool, enabling plaintiffs to try to uncover political influences
that agencies failed to disclose in the rulemaking record. This is what hap-
pened in the context of the lawsuit that challenged the FDA’s handling of
Plan B; the district court allowed discovery into the agency’s decision mak-
ing process, which unearthed evidence of improper political motivations
that were untethered from the relevant statutory inquiry.399
The second scenario discussed above—that of a rulemaking proceeding
in which the agency’s rulemaking record fails to acknowledge publicly visible
presidential involvement—could most effectively be dealt with by pushing
agencies to flag any significant presidential influence at key steps of the
rulemaking process, including in the notice of a proposed rulemaking as well
as in a final rule’s statement of basis and purpose. A statutory amendment
to section 553 of the APA would lead most quickly to this result, folding
disclosure requirements into the notice-and-comment process.400 Alterna-
tively, in the absence of an amendment to the APA, courts can use judicial
review doctrines to incentivize agencies to disclose presidential influences in
their rulemaking documents,401 and they also can penalize agencies for fail-
ing to provide the whole story. This may have been what was afoot in Motor
Vehicle Manufacturers v. State Farm.402 There, the Reagan administration’s
397. Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733, 769 (5th Cir. 2015).
398. See supra Section IV.B (discussing judicial review doctrines and disclosure rules as
transparency-enhancing mechanisms).
399. See supra notes 192–194 and accompanying text (discussing how discovery was al-
lowed in the Torti case).
400. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012) (setting forth the requisite procedures for notice-and-com-
ment rulemaking).
401. See supra notes 361–372 and accompanying text (discussing how courts should
reshape deference doctrines to incentivize agencies to disclose presidential influences).
402. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
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National Highway Traffic Safety Administration failed to acknowledge politi-
cal influences that likely influenced the agency’s decision to rescind a Carter
administration rule requiring certain cars to be equipped with either air
bags or automatic belts. The Supreme Court’s opinion, which found the
agency’s decision to be arbitrary and capricious,403 could be read as saying
“that the agency had not provided the full story,” and that the agency should
be forced “to reveal the political basis for its decisions” so that it also would
“consider the opposing political position.”404
Finally, the third scenario described above—that of Presidents encour-
aging agencies to set policy outside of the notice-and-comment process by
relying on their enforcement discretion—would best be dealt through judi-
cial clarification of the line between legislative rules, which are subject to
notice and comment, and nonlegislative rules, such as interpretive rules and
policy statements, which are exempt from such procedures.405 Currently, the
line between legislative rules and nonlegislative rules is “enshrouded in con-
siderable smog.”406 While it is beyond the scope of this Article to propose a
clearer and more effective test, greater clarity around this distinction would
help to avoid battles—like the one that recently erupted in the wake of
Obama’s executive action in the immigration arena—over the President’s
ability to direct agencies’ enforcement priorities. If future Presidents find
themselves as frustrated by congressional inaction as Obama has,407 then
they may increasingly try to effect legal change through backdoor routes that
undermine opportunities for public participation, highlighting the impor-
tance of bringing doctrinal clarity to this area of the law.
In sum, all three scenarios just discussed suggest the need to ensure that
presidential control does not undermine the notice-and-comment process
or the public’s right to participate in that process in a meaningful way. Vari-
ous process-forcing rules, including rules designed to avoid the evasion of
notice-and-comment procedures and rules designed to ensure that presiden-
tial influences are fully and openly disclosed in agencies’ rulemaking docu-
ments, must be part of any coordinated response to rising presidential
control.
403. Motor Vehicle Mfrs., 463 U.S. at 30.
404. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 Colum. L.
Rev. 1749, 1783 (2007).
405. In distinguishing policy statements from legislative rules, the D.C. Circuit has fo-
cused on whether the agency retained discretion or whether it bound itself. U.S. Tel. Ass’n v.
FCC, 28 F.3d 1232, 1234 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (“[W]e have said repeatedly that [the line between
legislative rules and policy statements] turns on an agency’s intention to bind itself to a partic-
ular legal policy position.”).
406. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d 1561, 1565 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (quoting
Am. Bus. Ass’n v. United States, 627 F.2d 525, 529 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
407. See Shear, supra note 140 and accompanying text (noting that Obama has been par-
ticularly frustrated by “congressional inaction”).
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Conclusion
George W. Bush’s and Barack Obama’s efforts to steer the regulatory
state demonstrate that presidential control involves a complicated mix of
positive and negative attributes. Yet administrative law has failed to adapt to
the entrenchment of presidential control, let alone respond to its complex-
ity. In an attempt to move administrative law forward, this Article has
mapped out how a wide variety of subconstitutional administrative law doc-
trines could be coordinated to provide a more nuanced and proactive re-
sponse to presidential control. In particular, this Article has identified three
relevant categories of administrative law doctrines—statutorily facing rules;
transparency-enhancing mechanisms; and process-forcing rules—that pro-
vide a powerful and much-needed roadmap for responding to many current
controversies swirling around presidential control.
